

2.1 When did nationalism + nation state start?

To understand the process of the possible dismantling of the nation state, it will first be necessary to understand how the nation state system came into being.

How did Europe become a space where the political organisation was the nation state?

To answer I will explain both the history (feudalism to modernity) and the categorisation by scholars into ethnic and civic nations (History and the way historians describe it). Answer to “when” this phenomenon started is a difficult task. Some ideas of what should we mean by nationalism which were drawn as exemplary forms of official nationalism have been highly criticised by current scholars, often because they did not allegedly take into account variables such time and political aims and because nationalism has often been treated as a social and psychological construct and/or as strictly related to the economic setting. So, modernist authors such Anderson believe that before possibly giving an answer to “When” we must be sure on “What” we intend by nationalism; Anderson thinks things would be easier if the phenomen were strictly thought as dependent on a concept of a political imagined community; such a community must be thought by its members as soverign and limited in terms of territory and number of the other members of it. The birth of the original consciousness of the nations and the nation states must be sought in the decrease in the numbers of written languages due to the economic reasons (thus causing also spoken language to reduce in number), in the new technology (print) and the capitalistic market forces which created(for the economic reasons above mentioned) monoglot readers. However, Anderson’s

view does not adequately take into consideration the homogenising and standardising power of the visual media over the last fifty years.

One of the primordialists, such as Woolf(1996:26)¹ shares and widens this concept by holding that *National identity is an abstract concept that sums up the collective expression of a subjective individual sense of belonging to a socio-political unit: the nation state* but at the same time not clearly drawing the line between nations and nation states. Woolf himself wrote that France was already a state in the 1870's but still not a "nation" if by nation we considered a phenomenon whose major feature is to play the collective identity conveyor. According to his typologies in the first phase a nation undergoes a period of scholarly interest on the language, the culture and the history of the nation. Stage two corresponds to the patriotic agitation when a small group, usually belonging to the intellectual elite, of people see as their mission the spreading of national consciousness among all their fellows. In these first two stages, the richest and the poorest strata are not represented but still, nobody from any profession is innerly irreplaceable (quoted in Guibernau 1999:97)². The third stage takes place when the success of the national movement is being achieved. There is more social participation and the "peasantry" take part in the nationalist movement. Edward H.Carr (1994: 243-245)³ divides the national movements in three causes which may have originated it: the first stage is the one following the dissolution of mediaeval unity of Empire and Church.

¹ Stuart Woolf, *Nationalism in Europe 1815 to the present. A reader*, Routledge, London and New York

² Montserrat, Guibernau *Nations without States. Political Communities in a Global*

³ Edward H. Carr, "Three Phases of Nationalism", in Hutchinson, & Smith, *Nationalism*, Oxford University Press, 1994

The Woolfian and Andersonian concepts are fatally influenced by the modern idea of nationalism as a product of ideological political planning to be found only once the self-determination as the authentic roots of national communities were identified as bottom-up shared feelings and not only as top-down political strategies. However, as we will see in the paragraphs which follow this vision is not shared by those scholars who set the origin of nationalism further back in history. Smith reconciles Modernists' and Primordialists' visions by observing that nationalism was born into allegiance and entered into contract.

Other scholars as Greenfeld started from a primordialist view.

She holds that the start of French nationalism was to search in the symbolic role played by France as the most Christian of the nations since 1254, but somehow suggesting (1993: 181) that the process towards French nationalism as a collectivist and civic prototype was not concluded.

In fact she holds that civic and collective nationalism in France contradictions given the anti-English sentiments which affected the whole processes in the colonial years.

For example, French pro-American sentiments in the colonies were stemming from the chance to contribute to English humiliation. In this case, French involvement in the War of American Independence had an important effect: the development of the subsequent French nationalism; the result, nationalism, was also achieved through the removal of all the past humiliation of the last wars. Lafayette himself listed the main reasons for his involvement in the American independence war: *my love for my country, my desire to witness the humiliation of her enemies*. Lafayette considered Americans and French

as two civic nation states. The contradictions are not only in terms of ethnic rivalry with the British but are also in the clash between individualistic nationalism (in a liberal society of free and equal individuals) and collective nationalism (influence by small groups who try to influence and direct the free will of the whole mass of the individuals)

This issue was not being developed at the end of the 17th century but became relevant in the 1750's when France had to rely on economic forces which had to be guided instead of private dominion of a free market (Greenfeld 2001: 119) which could not compete with the raising forces of England in the years 1669-1701, about a century after the new stage in the English economic development (Cipolla 1981: 282)⁴ What Greenfeld has in common with Smith, the latter being my theoretical framework, is the awareness that the prototype form of civic nationalism in France encompasses ethnic nationalism to a certain extent. Greenfeld tends to have a macro-historical perspective on this issue whilst Smith assumes that the symbol and the search for the ethnic origin by dating back their origin is something which has to do with the freedom of the individual.

⁴Carlo Cipolla, *Before The Industrial Revolution. European Society and Economy, 1000-1700*, Methuen, Second Edition, London, 1981;

2.1.1 Literature Review on Nationalism: Hastings

HASTINGS

Hastings is one of those scholars who differently from modernists tend to give a medieval birth to nationalism. According to his thought, England was already a proto-nation-state in the 9th century.

Nation-State in England seems to have precede both the Nation and the Kingdom⁵(Hastings 1997:48)

Hastings holds that Modernists' vision can be summarized as follows:

- 1) Nations are only in modernity (from late eighteenth century on)
- 2) Nations are created by Elite construction
- 3) State has primary role.

The concept of what should be defined as ethnic group is something physical because we often represent ethnicity like a feature proper of a community already present in a larger society the latter being the nation state. Schermerhorn⁶ define an ethnic group as a collectivity present in a larger social and human frame, possessing own **real or putative ancestry**, memories of a shared historical past, focus on one or more symbols. Hastings has chosen England as prototype of a nation with a strong cohesive feeling of unity which originates from a bottom up sentiment rather than by the work of elites. In fact he writes that *one major factor which frequently made a negative contribution to the ideology and consciousness of the English nation was the monarchy itself.*

⁵ Hastings Adrian, *The Construction of Nationhood-Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*, Cambridge University Press, 1997.

⁶ Richard Schermerhorn, "Ethnicity and Minority Groups," in *Ethnicity*, edited by Hutchinson-Smith, Oxford University Press, 1996

From the twelfth to the fifteenth century its mind was bewitched again and again by the mirage of ruling France and it clung to the use of the French language when it was largely abandoned and disliked by the nation. It is ironic that the Hundred Years War so greatly increased English national sentiment and anti-French feeling because the purpose of the war was to make the King of England King of France.(Hastings 1997:48). Nationalist sentiment is therefore seen by Hastings as in contrast with royal power.

Smith and Hutchinsons'⁷ vision of national identity qualified it as a multilayered construct featuring historic territory, homeland, shared myths and common historic memories; shared popular culture; same rights and duties; single economic territory with mobility of labour and exchange of goods.

Hastings focussed more on the features which qualify a nation state. A nation state should possess both pre-national features which were to be found in nations plus a different kind of bond to the citizens . In a

Nation state

1)Citizens **use** its vernacular language extensively in a written form which is often absent in pre-modern societies. At that time in western Europe Latin was the only Lingua franca for its flexibility and because it responded to the demands of a powerful institution such as the Roman church.

2) Be **loyal** to both the concepts of **shared culture and identity**

3) Have a control over a specific geographic territory in a more conscious way than ethnic groups.

⁷ Hutchinson-Smith, *Nationalism*, Oxford university Press, 1994.

4) Citizens identify themselves with society horizontally. They have the feeling to have an active part in it.

In few words, Hastings believes that nation, ethnicity, nationalism and religion are “four distinct and determinative elements within European and world history” (Hastings 1997:1)

Of course, many of Hastings’ ideas are also shared by those he defined as modernists.

The major difference is that Hastings individuates the core of nation building process at the time of the imperial struggles at the end of the sixteenth century. What is more, according to Hastings, classical modernists have almost forgotten the importance of religion in the nation building process.

2.1.2 Gellner, Hobsbawm, Rifkin, Anderson: Modern Invention of tradition new capitalism, and print capitalism

GELLNER

Gellner is among those scholars who set a difference between been patriotic about city, local area, rulers or even empires and a loyalty committed to a nationality. He holds tha nationalism was seen as the whole agencies able to undertake social reforms and to promote human progress were to receive emphatic endorsement in Europe only in the 18th century (Özkiriml 2000: 39).

Gellner's theory was stimulated by his encounter with Kedourie's *Nationalism* (1960). Kedourie's famous openings is quoted in Gellner (1997:10)⁸ *Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century*. In 1983 Gellner states that the traditional ethnic group as the main theoretical background for nationalism was never the small, homogeneous with high degree of intragroupal solidarity (*Gemeinschaft*) but was the *Gesellschaft*, "the chauvinistic nation state" instead (Wright 2004: 282 quoting Gellner 1983)⁹. As we can see in nowadays political instances(eg. In Catalonia), *Gesellschaft* is being applied to smaller context thus creating a new form of nation building as a subspecies of a wider European shared identity or a as one of the layers forming people's identity.

Gellner main ideas were that Nations are not given but are created by states and by those who works to spread

⁸Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism*, Phoenix Paperback, 1997

⁹ Sue Wright, *Language Policy and Language Planning. From Nationalism to Globalisation*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; Ernest, Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism. New Perspectives on the Past*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca New York,, Blackwell Publishers,1983

these ideas, namely, the nationalists (Gellner 1997: Preface IX), but he regretted his inactivity of the first period when he did not replace or correct the Kedourian view of nationalism as an utterly constructed contingency .

Differently from Keourie's ideas, Gellner saw nationalism as the inevitable destiny of the modern world (Gellner 1997: Ibidem). However, Gellner wrote that nations and nationalist sentiments are not found universally and moreover they don't last for ever (Gellner 1997:5). In his latest book, (Wright 2004: 244-246 quoting Gellner 1998:181¹⁰) Gellner explains how the individual has a spiritual contractual power within the community but he/she can withdraw their support to such a social contract.

In fact, Gellner, makes these distinctions on a vision based on the role of humans in societies (Wright 2004: 244). Gellner's vision has also been interpreted by those scholars who focussed on small nations and language policies. Each citizen may decide that he/she are not satisfied with the boundaries which represent or not represent their own nation state or the nations they feel to be loyal to (eg. Williams 1994¹¹).

Gellner (1983, p.6, quoted in Williams 1997:24) points out that national claims may exist only provided a nation state exists. Gellner seems to focus on the building of contingent relationship between the nations and the nation states. Thus Gellner presumes that nationalism stems from a situation of conflict with the nations state but he also argues that "*The state has certainly emerged without the help of the nation*" (Gellner 1983: p.6)

¹⁰ Gellner Ernest, *Language and Solitude: Wittgenstein, Malinowki and the Habsburg Dilemma*, Cambridge University Press, 1998

¹¹ Colin H. Williams, *Called Unto Liberty! On language and nationalism*, Multilingual Matters 97, Clevedon, 1994

The community postulated by Gellner is neither the individualistic one nor the communalistic one. Gellner doesn't think the free will of the individual is a background issue to the formula which may identify a nation as much as the concept of shared culture which *brings in far too rich a catch. Human history is and continues to be well endowed with cultural differentiations* (Gellner 1983:54)

Gellner's paradigm is that we cannot define nationalism or nation building in terms of the allegedly age of the nations, but we can only **define nations in terms of age of nationalism** (Gellner 1983:55). Ultimate Gellner's work tried to combine the concepts underlying nationalism and their political applications. Gellnerian applications were in the concepts of modern anonymity in contrast with rural societies. His vision of society was a classical Sociological one which was founded on the basic distinction between traditional and modern stages of societies which were to be divided into hunter-gatherer societies, agro-literates and industrial ones.

He saw the high culture model as a pervasive one and a model which changed the concept of nationalism. *That homogenous culture is THE political bond, that mastery off (and one should add, acceptability in) a given high culture (the one used by surrounding bureaucracies) is the precondition of political, economic and social citizenship. If you satisfy this condition, you can enjoy your **droit de cité**. If you do not, you must accept second-class and subservient status, or you must assimilate, or migrate, or seek to change the situation thorough irredentist nationalist activity. This principle does not operate in other social conditions and is not a permanent part of the human psyche or social order; it is not an ideological invention, or a political device at the*

service of other interests; nor is it the expression of dark, blind, atavistic forces. Then it concludes by making clear its pessimistic vein: But it operates powerfully in our type of social condition, it has a strong hold over the hearts and minds of men, and it is not transparent to those under its sway, who generally do not understand its genuine mainsprings (Gellner 1997:29-30).

Gellner identified four main theories on nationalism which are included in Özkirimli (2000: 129 quoting Gellner 1983: 129-130):

1. *the nationalist theory which sees nationalism as a natural, self evident and self-generating phenomenon:*
2. *Kedourie's theory which treats it as 'an artificial consequence of ideas which did not need ever to be formulated, and appeared by regrettable accident';*
3. *"The Wrong Address Theory" favoured by Marxists which holds that the "awakening message was intended for **classes**, but by some terrible postal error was delivered to **nations**; and*
4. *"Dark Gods Theory" shared by both lovers and haters of nationalism which regards it as "the re-emergence of the atavistic forces of blood or territory"*

RENAN

Ernest Renan (1823-1892) who is quoted very often by many contemporary scholars because was one of the first scholars to provide a systematic-historical definition of nation in his important essay on this issue which was delivered on the 11th of March 1882 (*Qu'est-ce qu'une nation ?* La Sorbonne, Paris, 1882)

In those days the concepts of large-scale solidarity already existed. Society was changing fast and the feeling of an alleged unity in the past was quite convenient to try and give the members of society a certain amount of the same feelings in order to have more control over it. When Renan was writing his essays which was largely based on spiritual concepts which are very good to explain how the shared concept of loyalty to “a concept of unity” did not take into consideration the changes in the way of life caused by market forces but he was able to get rid of concepts such as “race” to qualify ethnic nation building which were still present in Italy for example. The concept of race was retained by many scholars because it was not considered as an artefact whilst borders, geographies, royal marriages, and political commitments in general were already perceived as artificial. Renan does not reject the past higher levels of groupal homogeneity but he sees it as part of a past vertical chronology when he mentions the lack of huge “racial” shift between fifth century German peoples and tenth century Normans (Renan translated in *Dahbour Omar & Ishay, Micheline R., 1999: 144*)¹². According to this theory Germans (and we must insert Renan in the French-German context of

¹²Omar Dahbour & Micheline R Ishay, *The Nationalism Reader*, Humanity Books, 1999, Prometheus Books

those years of tensions) have the rights to retake the scattered members of the Germanic family, even when these members do not ask for reunion (Dabhour 1999: 147). However, Renan is well aware of the subsequent fusion of populations that have occurred in many groups both before the fifth century A.D. and afterwards but he holds that the concept of race is very important and cannot be underestimated because its roots are in ancient European familistic division of society.

Renan may not have investigated the economic perspective in details but he was one of the first scholars to develop the concept of human choice in the construction of a nation by a community of citizens thus dividing the concept of nationalism in two mainstreams: the voluntaristic and the organic ones. In chapter one Renan wrote: *L'établissement d'un nouvel Empire romain ou d'un nouvel Empire de Charlemagne est devenu une impossibilité. La division de l'Europe est trop grande pour qu'une tentative de domination universelle ne provoque pas très vite une coalition qui fasse rentrer la nation ambitieuse dans ses bornes naturelles* (Renan 1882 :Chapter I).

It is clear from the very beginning that the substance of the terms are very easily misunderstood. Renan declares it in its incipit: *une idée, claire en apparence, mais qui prête aux plus dangereux malentendus* “*Claire in apparence*”.

The gist of the modern idea of nationalism is appearance itself which is the perception of reality shared by the citizens who have chosen to become part of a nation. This concept is a key issue in the work of many modernist scholars which followed but the danger of the micro-groupal component is present in the guidelines for

civic nationalism described by Renan. These component is a major issue in Smith's integrate theory.

HOBSBAWM & MAZZINI

According to Hobsbawm (1994)¹³ it was only thanks to the temporary allegiance between liberal capitalism and communism that Nation States could lay the new foundations of nowadays global economy.

Hobsbawm points out how the building and the importance gained by linguistic and cultural community was not present before the nineteenth century¹⁴ (Hobsbawm 1990:101).

His vision of nationalism is dyadic because he divides it in a civic, political and democratic nationalism deriving it from the French Revolution and in a ethnic, linguistic and cultural nationalism and he assigns its creation to the German Romantics (Smith 1999: 204)¹⁵ This vision divides civic and ethnic nationalism as if they belonged to two clear positions in a virtual timespan. Civic nationalism is considered a homogenous force in powerful states. The global aim of this kind of state is to create a larger market

As many modernists, Hobsbawm holds(1990: 37-38) that the main important criterions are 1) The historic association with a current state or with one with a sufficient “long” past 2)The existence of cultural elites which possessed a standardized writte vernacular. 3) The ability to conquest. Hobsbawm points out that there is nothing like the capacity to “being an imperial people” in order to create a collective identification with the nation state.

¹³ Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes- The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991*

¹⁴ Hobsbawm, *nations and Nationalism since 1780*, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

¹⁵Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, Oxford University Press, 1999

Hobsbawm indicates 1917-1942 as the years of the temporary disappearance of Liberalism and of those economies shaped on a model which stem from Mazzini's "every nation a state" (Hobsbawm 1990: 101; Bonifazi 1992: 326)¹⁶ and "only one state for the entire nation". The two halves of Mazzini's thought are not antithetic. They indicate nation building as a process which builds on ethnic nationalism to turn it to civic nationalism once the majority of the citizens share the made up idea of a community of blood and souls. Mazzini saw civic nation as the only society assuring the single citizen the exercise of his rights, but duties were owed to the country even if Mazzini makes clear that the commitment to mankind should be prior to commitment to the country (*Dahbour Omar & Ishay, Micheline R., 1999: 91-97*). Mazzini's country is a fellowship of free and equal men bound together in brotherly concord of labour towards a single end (*Dahbour, IBIDEM*). Mazzini sees the nation as an organic dispenser of single rights through collective strengths. Virtue, Equality and Brotherhood are the post-Revolutionary ingredients on which Mazzini framed his thought and subsequent political actions.

The next step is assimilation, a liberal institution, which could not exist in a society where the perception of economic services had moral effects which enhanced the demand of solidarity (Durkheim 1933-1984: p.17). Despite its acknowledgement of the importance played by market forces and industrialization Hobsbawm seemed not to take into consideration the importance of ethnicity in modern states as an artefact which assumes real features and he did not provided a careful analysis

¹⁶ Bonifazi, "Storia dell'idea federalista" in *Società e Democrazia*, Bulgarini 1992; Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

of the interactions and mixtures between ethnic and civic nationalism(Smith 1999:205)

RIFKIN

Hobsbawm views contained in the third pinpoint above diverge with the economic post modernist vision (eg Rifkin's views in 2004¹⁷) which no longer sets the origin of nation building in the imperial strength in the hands of the elites. However Rifkin's and others economicist views on nationalism holds that we are in a post-nation-state era in which no class struggle exists anymore but only cultural affiliation plays a major role in building a post-modern nation-state identity given the large new immigration flows and new economic divides.

New economic divides are not present as class struggle but as the offspring of a diminishing welfare (thus implying a diminished collective action taken by the nation state as an organic institution). According to Rifkin, EU works as a affiliation tool even in the economic strategy of the nation states given the fact that in many Eu member states (eg. Germany and France, Rifkin 2004:249) the immigration population is systematically excluded from employment by many industries¹⁸.

¹⁷Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream*, New York, Tarcher-Penguin 2004

¹⁸ In the paragraphs dedicated on Italy it will be clear as at micro-level the exclusion of immigrant population from employment is not being taken by the small industrial elites in Northern Italy. In the case the divide is between European and nation-state regulations against the affiliation or assimilation of new immigrants and the economic demand of small enterprises. The economic demand may change the policies if the assimilation of non-Eu immigrants is pushed forward by the president of the Republic Ciampi whilst conservati and governative forces still play on ethnic nationalism to assure their electors a sensation of safety and stability

ANDERSON

Özkirimli describes Anderson's starting point as an attempt to build an equalization between nationalism and cultural artefacts; to do so he quotes Breully's vision who marked Anderson's work as reductionist because it showed lack of congruence "cultural" and "political" nationalism especially when he focuses on Official Nationalism and Imperialism in Europe (Anderson¹⁹ 1991, chapter 5 pp.67-82 and 6, pp.83-111). Özkirimli seems to refuse to accept as valid any discourse which generalizes the cultural dimension instead of contextualizing it to smaller settings such as small groups.

Moreover, Anderson seems to have underestimated the importance of wars in building a national consciousness and hyperestimated the role of print capitalism over language choice: *In its huge, ramshackle, polyglot, but increasingly literate, domain the replacement of Latin by **any** vernacular, in the mid nineteenth century, promised enormous advantages to those of its subjects who **already** used that print-language, and appeared correspondingly menacing to those who did not.* (Anderson 1991: 78)

I think that Print Capitalism is very useful to explain some of the standardization processes which went on all over Europe in the 18th and 19th century, but for what Italian standardization is concerned we will see how this started from a cultural elite instead of a dynamic bourgeoisie movement.

Anderson's example of the language in use by the Habsburg as an example of non-direct participation of the language in nationalism was not perceived as an

¹⁹Benedict, Anderson, *Imagined Communities: reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso 1983-1991

example but as an attempt to find a general theory which was therefore rejected by some scholars as Breuily despite the good value of Anderson's work in terms of new cultural-focussed attitude towards the theory of nationalism. However, Anderson's diachronic and synchronic world-wide vision of patterns in nationalism seems to confirm its roots in the ruling classes.

2.1.3 Trying to reconcile Modernist and Primordialists: Smith; Economic and Normative views on Nation Building: Giddens, Elster.

According to Özkirimli (2000:49) Smith was one of the first modern scholars who since the early 1980s shifted the study of the motifs and consequences of nationalism away from the European borders trying to insert the overall phenomenon in a globalized society with new values, new web of relationships, new media, new traditions.

Smith criticizes the narrative and chronological patterns of modern studies of nationalism (Smith: 2000: 6-7)²⁰. He explained the basic opposition or dichotomy between what he calls voluntaristic or civic nationalism and organic or ethnic nationalism. Smith thinks Renan's thought belongs to civic nationalism because he did not describe a Nation whose compatriots were live reminders of the glorious or mythological past of the nation, but, the nation Renan had in mind was embedded in the human choice of the individual, in the ethic choice to respect the rules the community built when it was founded.

What Özkirimli seems not to record is the fact that after the Second World War, an important feature of nationalism was the contrast between small and large states (Woolf 1996: 4)²¹

In the 1960s it was difficult to foresee whether the small nations were likely to pursue once again a voluntaristic, subjective, in a way a liberal sense of nationalism or an

²⁰ Anthony D. Smith, *The Nation in history. Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism, The Menahem Jerusalem Lectures*, University Press of New England, 2000

²¹ Stuart, Woolf, *Nationalism in Europe 1815 to the present. A reader*, Routledge, London and New York, 1996

organic objective existence of a nation, defined by language or blood, ascribed to German nationalism (Woolf 1996: Ibidem). This was the situation in the sixties and there was no clear hint of the European policies of the nineties and of the possibility by small nations to pursue independence without giving the language much more importance than the necessity of independence in internal affairs or in economic policies or that relatively small nations, (eg. Catalonia) were likely to use language identification in a civic way and giving less importance to any ethnic feature within their nationalistic movements. For this reason the traditional modernist division of nationalism as described by Özkirimli as Humanitarian, Jacobin, Traditional, Liberal, Integral and Economic may be no longer precise if considered both formally and practically distinct.

Giddens (2001)²² illustrates recent thinkers and Ernest Gellner in particular as the most important thinker of nationalism theories. Giddens did it so because as we can understand in *Introduction to Sociology*(1991-2003)²³ it is only with the development of political systems where the authorities can have more influence on the customs and habits of the citizens we have a form of more integrated national community which was otherwise impossible in traditional civilizations or states (Giddens 2003 p.78). The overall idea shared by many modernists is that Pastoral and Agrarian Societies did not rely on solid economies of exchange and therefore there wasn't a class of traders which could control and regulate profit flows generated by the control of

²² Anthony Giddens, *Sociology*, 4th Edition, Polity, 2001

²³ Anthony Giddens, *Introduction to Sociology*, 4th edition, 1991-2003

inanimate power resources or strategic resources (eg. modern control of the chain of distribution). The decision of where and with whom create demands and markets was not possible unless modern media of transportations and media of communication were implemented.

The goods were mainly products instead of services and these products were perishable. The characteristic of geographical borders and the lack of systematic exploitation of commodity money (Giddens 1990:24)²⁴ which would have involved the intervention of an institution which could grant values and would have enabled its citizens to pay debts which were necessarily to be recognised as a private transaction. There wasn't such institution so that there could not be a balance between debts and credits on a virtual infinite number of transactions (Giddens 1990 Ibidem). Market forces contrast the circulation of money and goods. All these modern mechanisms, as Giddens points out (Giddens 1990:26-36) can easily work only if we are in presence of a shared "trust" or "faith". Trusting an institution who is granting for values and credits is an important step in the history of nation building. If such an institution was missing, the social network which is a primary need of the individual was provided by the kinship, which was originated by blood ties. This was the only way of establishing links between an internal "environment" to the external ones: *The first context of trust is the kinship system, which in most pre-modern settings provides a relatively stable mode of organising "bundles" of social relations between time and space.*(Giddens 1990:101). Giddens focuses on the importance of the coherence

²⁴ *The Consequences of Modernity*, Stanford University Press, 1990

between the physical borders and the social and localised relationships in pre-modern civilizations. Then, the *locus*, had not yet been used as a conveyor of *distanciated space-time relations* (Giddens, *Ibidem*).

Many post-modern scholars have focussed in turn on the individual processes which have led to the formation of nation states and/or to the collective processes which have led to the formation of nation states. The process of adjustment or removal which is often important feature of nation building is presented by authors such Hobsbawm as a natural process. Others as Jon Elster prefer to de-codify such processes by studying the rationality, the individualism and the constraints which the individual accepts in order to bind society together. The norms itself, although often very logical become the motivations for behaviours not very logical and not future oriented. According to Elster (1989 a: 98)²⁵ rational action is concerned with outcomes. So, it comes as no surprise that nation building may be defined such as a very rational policy built up by politicians, head of states, writers, journalists, common people. It is also true that those are the same people which forms a human agency, a living medium of communication that responds to strong emotions. In the Elsterian vision the ultimate question with nation building is how much real freedom a person has to act within a community²⁶.

2.1.4 Civic nationalists: History of France. How did the nation emerge

²⁵ John Elster, *The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order*. Studies in Rationality and Social Change. New York & Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989

²⁶ Bagozzi, Baumgartner, et Al, "The role of emotions in goal-directed behaviour," in *The Why of Consumption*, Routledge, London-New york, 2000, pp.36-58

Before moving to a discussion of Italian nation building and the place of Sardinia within that process, it may be useful to look at two instances of European nation building which can be seen as epitomising the civic and ethnic categories described above. First I shall look at France which is the prime example of a civic nation which underwent a strong process of identity homogenisation (although as I hope to show the French do sometimes act in much the same ways as groups considered to be ethnic). Then I will consider Germany as the template for ethnic nationalism (although again, the German government over the last decades acted in much the same ways as groups considered to be civic)

Paragraph I. Various views on when did the nation state start

The seeds of civic nationalism must be found in a pre-revolutionary era when the relationships between the single to his/her lord changed to the relationship between the single to the nation state. Crouch(Crouch 2004:31-33)²⁷ observes that pre-revolutionary France presented a situation similar to contemporary post-democracy if we considered the. In fact, according to Crouch's vision, the ruling class acted as many corporate firms which may find not congenial to pay a certain amount of taxes or they cannot easily influence policies and governments they simply decide not to invest their money in that area. Corporate elites cannot take away the right to vote but they influence the voters. On the other hand pre-revolutionary France middle class and peasantry had to pay taxes and had no political

²⁷ Colin, Crouch, *Post-Democracy. Themes for the 21st century*, Polity Press Ltd, Cambridge, UK, 2004

rights, whilst the aristocracy, which resembled German Junker, had all the political rights and paid no taxes. Crouch finds these two situation resemblant because as described later, the monarch ruled thorough its vassals and he could be ruling away from his land just like the Corportae elites.

However, the repression of middle class dynamicity and the concentration of political power in few hands and the presence of a complete deregulated market has proven to be a very good firestarter for energising the revolutionary strengths.

Much before the revolution the priority to build a nation was the existence of clear borders. The existence of clear borders was thought as a necessity which would have prevented people from crossing them easily. As Crouch pointed out, the majority of people were “relegated” within the borders even when these were arbitrary. The conveyor of unity was religion at least until The Treaty of Westfalia(1648, Wright 2004:27). The Treaty was also a major step towards the shift from feudalism to a more modern political conception of allegiances and wider inter-national relationships given the political autonomy of the single states. Greenfeld tends to start the idea of French Nation before the Treaty (Greenfeld 1993)²⁸. She holds that a reasonable time span to start the idea of France as a nation state must be the 100 years war. She points out how at a certain point in French history the perception of a kingdom as an ethnic community ruled by the king who represented all the institutions included the Frankish vassal and the

²⁸ Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism, Five Roads to Modernity*, Harvard University Press paperback edition, 1993

ordinary free man (Bloch 1962)²⁹ switched to a more territorial perception of it. Louis IX, who was the only King of France to be canonized ever (1297 by Pope Bonifacio VIII), was, as many rulers between the middle age and the French revolution polyglot and non linked by the *ius sanguinis* to his land, being of mixed ethnies. He was son of a Spaniard, Blanche of Castile who was in turn half Spanish and half English her mother being Eleanor of England and her grandfather of King Henry II former Duke of Normandy.

The importance of this character who took part to the Crusades twice (with poor results) is twofold. First of all, he was an absolutist monarch like Louis XIII and XIV (despite the strong two generational influence exerted on them by Italian Cardinal Mazzarino) whose aims were to take over as many lands as they could in France and that he was re-utilised as a nationalist symbol for political purposes during the French religion wars until the reconciliation which in 1598 (Edict of Nantes).

The Edict of Nantes set a distinction between the necessity of establish national unity (and fixed borders) and religious rights to protestants thus debunking the political scheme *cuius region eius religio*. For this reason the process described by Greenfeld who gave much importance to the Hundred Years' War is only the initial stage of the formation of the French nation but it is true that the strong influence of Catholicism was re-utilised even in a post-revolutionary era by Napoleon III.

²⁹Marc Bloch, *Feudal Society, volume I, The growth of Ties of Dependence*, translated from the French *La Société Féodale*, by L.A. Manyon, Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD, London, 1962.

As we have above mentioned, absolutist monarchs, in particular Louis XIII and Louis XIV, were centralisers (Greenfeld 1993). They took power from the nobility and ruled from Paris, through the agency of a bureaucracy that reported directly to them. They were also the rulers who fixed the frontiers of the French state. The treaties that concluded Louis XIV's wars extended the French state to the Pyrenees and towards the north and the east. Louis XIV ended a process that had started with the Hundred Years' War (1337-1453), with the secession of Calais to France in 1559³⁰. Anderson argues that **the French started to imagine themselves as a group once borders were fixed**. We can say that *Once the boundaries of the state were reasonably stable, this process of homogenising the people living on the territory of the state began* (Wright 2004: 27). At first this homogenisation concerned only religion. In 1685, Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes, which had allowed French Protestants freedom of worship. The monarchy was, however, little worried by other forms of diversity, such as language.

Paragraph II. Absolutism. Review of the ideas of the political writers that "people" give legitimacy to governments. The requirements of 1st Republic, everybody must be French in a monolingual state

Woolf(1996:27) reminds us that in the 1870s the French nation state was already 100 years old.

All the citizens were being pressed to emphasize their French identity their prime identity. We could state that post-revolution France was in the third phase if we

³⁰ In fact, Corsica which was literally bought from the Genovese in 1768 (despite the possibility to get Genovese sovereignty back until 1789) and the inclusion of Nice and Savoy in 1860,

considered Hroch's system³¹ for the develop of national movements.

Greenfeld(1993) holds that the concept of patriotism was generated by absolute monarchs. The loyalty to the monarchs was now stemming from the citizens in a wider context if compared to Feudalism. In the middle age monarchs were seen as blood-tied to deity, whilst after the 100 years war, iconography and deity were still identity messages for the subjects, but what monarchy did represent was the identification with the entire land. The land and the country was now ready to follow the colonial path to gain more power to the monarchy but as a consequence of the construct, to the population itself although iconically.

Thus, the possibility for the bishops or princes of exercising their territorial sovereignty was not considered weird. The major change was the identification of the nation with the sovereign. Carr considers the second period which ended in 1914 as a “delicate” balancing of “nationalism” and “internationalism”, that means that now the state had to intensify national feelings without allowing any clash on a large scale which could lead to warfare. Existing units in internal affairs had to be subverted and single national economies were becoming a single world economy all over the 19th century. Carr holds that the third period brought more change in the character of nation building and that was due to the change of the economical environment which as a consequence caused a change in the attitude towards nationalism. Carr suggests three possible sub-causes to the outburst of the a new kind of

³¹ M., Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. A comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations*(translated by B.Fowkes), Cambridge University Press, 1985

nationalism: 1) *The bringing of new social strata within the effective membership of nation* 2) *The visible reunion of economic with political power* 3) *The increase in the number of nations.*

The social strata implied the concept of civic membership of the nation and he holds, like many, that this influenced the last three decades of the 19th century once the democratization process of the earlier part of it had resulted in the establishment of popular control over the functions of maintaining law and order, guaranteeing the rights of property and, in general, “holding the ring,” for the operations of an economic society managed and directed from another centre under rules of its own. (Carr 1994:244-245) From then on Carr sees the political power of the masses and their economic conditions as a paramount element which could lead to conflict when necessary with the policies implemented by other states.

La Première République: 1792-1804

The idea of a great past became a Canon which was to influence the late 18th and 19th century citizens rather than medieval people.

Cobban (1994:249)³² thinks that before the French Revolution it was not necessary to find any direct relationship between the state as a political unit and the nation as a cultural one. The French revolution combined and through nationalistic elites of the middle class spread these two concepts. The new concepts were based on the basic idea of the nation as the major legal principle.

According to Cobban(1994: 245-250) *The French Revolution must not be thought of as no more than a struggle to establish in France principles of government that already existed, although perhaps in an imperfect form, in those countries where medieval representative institutions survived* (Cobban 1994: 247). Cobban gives his general views which imply the revolution not as a change in the institutions and in the concept of the state in France but as a deed which became a theory.

French influence and domination in Europe came to an end in 1815 when the treaty of Vienna was signed. According to Baycroft(1998:12-13)³³ the only thing which was left of the influence of the revolution was the idea of nation.

³² Alfred, Cobban, "The Rise of the Nation-State System," in Hutchinson & Smith, *Nationalism*, Oxford University Press, 1994

³³ Timothy Baycroft, *Nationalism in Europe 1789-1945*, Cambridge Perspectives in History, Cambridge University Press, 1998

The National Language 1792-1994

Fishman³⁴ argues that the pre-revolution elites did not manage to speak a single vernacular (but as he wrote, they had a continuum of vernaculars Fishman 1973: 41) nor a vernacular ready to be used for organisational and ideological purposes. Actually this situation was still present in the years following the French Revolution as shown by the famous survey conducted by Abbe' Gregoire in 1792. According to his data those who could speak the nation-state language were only 11%. There were only very few exceptions³⁵, and actually the only nation who refused to conform to the civic nationalistic model was *La Corse*..

Language planning plays a role in both ethnic and civic nation building and it may lead to consider the two

³⁴ J. Fishman, *Language and Nationalism*, Rowley, Mass, Newbury House, 1973

³⁵ In some areas the monoglossia in the now "minorized" languages had arisen steadily in the following centuries despite the nationalistic policies towards the achievement of one language one nation state. As a matter of fact, Coquebert de Montbret (*L'Enquête 181-1812* and *Mélanges sur les langues, dialects et patois*, 1831)³⁵ showed that the speakers of Breton were 967.000 by 1808 and Paul Sebilot (quoted in Broudic 1997 and 1999) holds that in 1886 Breton speakers were 1.320.000 and he has estimated 51% of Basse-Bretagne population being monoglot Breton and only 5% being monoglot French. Thus we are able to say that monolanguage shift within the civic nation state was *prolifique* only from the beginning of the 20th century onward. Broudic (1993) argues that in 1905 Breton monoglots were 900.000(60% of the whole Bretons) and by 1952 the percentage had fallen down to 100.000(7% of Breton population). French dominant and Breton dominant bilinguals were almost the same in 1905(500.000 for each category, 33%) but by 1952 a contradiction which may have been a result of the 2nd World War clashes was the following: the Breton dominant bilinguals had risen to 700.000(47%) and French dominant bilinguals were 300.000(only 20%) but French monoglots had shifted from 100.000 in 1905(7%) to 400.000(27%) in 1952. After the Second World War it seems that in Brittany the official domains was shifting to French for goods whilst maybe a revival of Britanite was in progress and that led to a strong ethnic appeal for the rights to be taught in Breton in Schools which gave poor results because the government did not apply it properly by trying to leave the burden to citizens as single individual who had a right instead of a group who had a language right

aspects as intermingled and not clearly separated both historically and socially. Fichte holds that a separate language always means a separate state (Fichte 1807 quoted in Wright 2004:45)³⁶. The rulers' strive towards a single language for each nation is a paramount issue not only in the French nationbuilding.

A fundamental legacy of French nationbuilding relies on the fact that post-revolutionary France became the greatest icon of the "emotional, legacy and cultural significance of national citizenship" (Føllesdal 1999: 107)³⁷.

The post revolutionary citizenship was equal more in terms of the theoretical construct which underlined the concept rather than its effective application in terms of tool which would re-shape social institutions. Both in France in the post-revolutional era and pre-European Union the policies towards multilingualism have hardly any importance. Of course the two effects, namely, the France not "caring" for minority languages, cannot be treated deterministically. In fact, language policies towards the uprising of French as only language spoken and written in France was openly declared by the revolutionary activists whilst many policies of the 20th century tend to use the homogeneising factor of the French language as a silent weapon which as a result obtain mono-loyalty and total assimilation. The widespread of standard French was political in first place³⁸. The fear of "laissez faire" a tower of Babel was

³⁶ Fichte, J, *Reden an die deutsche Nation*, Munich, Goldmann, 1807-1808/1908:25

³⁷ Andreas Føllesdal, "Third country nationals as European Citizens," in Wright, Sue, Dennis Smith, *Whose Europe? The turn towards democracy*, Blackwell 1999.

³⁸ We will see how in the Italian peninsula a partial language mutual intelligibility was achieved according to some scholars was more based on a literary strength of 14th century Florentin rather

heavily played by both the First Republican government and by the Marxist elites in the century which followed the revolution. Yet, almost two centuries after the revolution, in 1994, “Loi Toubon” was issued to defend the allegedly “purity” and homogeneity of the French standard by prohibiting public use of non-French words. This process of linguistic centralistic nationalism is rooted in the Renaissance and Reformation(Wright-Smith 1999:86)³⁹.

The vernacular promoted by print capitalism had the consequence of reducing the differences along the language continuum. The first consequences were the cancellation of some of the written varieties of those languages which had occupied both official and non-official domains until then.

Roussillon area

In the case of the Northern variety of Catalan in the Roussillon area, we may observe that the annexion by the Kingdom of France in 1659 did not imply a sudden outspread of written and spoken French. The language lost its domains step by step and the consequent downsized should be measured by using decades as the proper variable for such scaling.

From the 18th century on the spoken language was still present and the majority of the population was native Catalan speaker but the language had started to shrink by losing its written official domain. Therefore the possible output can be summarised in a diglossic

than a central policy even considered that the Savoy elites who wanted to “create the Italians” had “created” Italy by “enlarging” the Realm of Sardinia, were native speakers of French-Provençal whilst the Sardinian subjects were mainly monoglot in Sardinian(Bolognesi-Heeringa 2005)

³⁹Sue Wright, “A community that can communicate? The linguistic factor in European integration,” in Sue Wright, Dennis Smith, *Whose Europe? The turn towards democracy*, Blackwell 1999.

continuum based on a model invented by Baker and Jones (“The iceberg analogy” 1998) and quoted and revisited by Bolognesi-Heeringa(2005:46-47)⁴⁰. According to this model, the diglossic continuum include both the superficial features of bilingualism as well as the inner ones and they reject the idea that invasions would create phonological or structural changes in language provided the invasion is not massive and its monarch dwells abroad. They tend to deprive the strengths of middle age monarchies of any political-decisional relevance by assessing that the rural populations had always kept their vernaculars(which, in the case of the latin continuum they were in turn a product of invasion, annexion and bureaucratic administration)

Bolognesi⁴¹ and Baker Jones would represent the Catalan-Occitan diglossic continuum on a line from informal register (eg. mainly spoken language) to (formal) by dividing written and spoken language into continual categories as (from informal to formal) NorthernCatalan---Frenchised----Catalan-----Regional French----Standard French (formal)

What the majority of applied linguists are missing, Bolognesi included, is that the forces which produced a diglossic continuum were not the “invaders”⁴² who

⁴⁰C. Baker, S.P.Jones, *Encyclopedia of Bilingualism and Bilingual Education*, Clevedon, Multilingual Matters Ltd, 1998; Roberto Bolognesi, Willbert Heeringa, *Sardegna fra tante lingue. Il contatto linguistico in Sardegna dal medioevo a oggi*, Condaghes, 2005

⁴¹ Bolognesi-Heeringa used this categorisation to analyse the diglottic continuum within the Sardinian language(Bolognesi 2005, Ibidem)

⁴² Bolognesi showed through a very interesting computational analysis that the Sardinian language is not a static and conservative language; he has also showed that language in contact(especially when the “invaders” do not outnumber the “invaded”) not always(at least in the case of Sardinia) influence language structures heavily but they limit their influence in “borrowings” which rarely outnumber a few hundred words. What plays a major role is the

landed and took over the place but language policy and language planning instead⁴³.

Thus, elites have a major role in producing a language shift, especially written, by strong top down administrative decisions. In the case of France the written language started to spread within the ruling classes who were the first to gain from an enlarged community of communication. However the Monarchy and then the Republic had to use language as a tool for the social construct called patriotism. Patriotism was the only way to assure a prime loyalty to the super-nation thus relegating the minor-nation in the unformal and familiar sphere. The *Res Publica* was to be in French regardless of any important role played in the past by the minority languages which were doomed to be downsized and neglected⁴⁴. In Republican France the administration needed to be able to communicate with all the citizens because the relationship between State and single citizens had changed. When the changes affected education, all the lower classes ceased to be

representation of the importance of those language in contact in the literature and in the print media(in the case of post-colonial nations) because they rarely were too many in numbers(This is the case of the Normans in Southern Italy and of Catalans in Sardinia) and they tended to be male and not married and therefore after their first marriage their offspring would cope with double or multiple loyalties.

⁴³ The present situation of former-Catalan speaking Roussillon is quite resemblant to that of Sardinia. It is easy to surf the net and have a quick look at the official web site of the town of Roussillon: as in many other(Wright 2006: Journal of Language and Policies) official websites French is the only vehicular language and not much room is left to Catalan. In Cagliari it happens more or less the same.

⁴⁴ Catalan, Occitan, Corsican, were all languages which had an important literacy(Corsicans both from higher and lower classes looked deferently at ancient Tuscan for a long time) but did not played an important role(with the short-term exception of Corsica), in the genesis of the nation states. On the other hand, the presence of a German standard has helped the South tyroler to keep their German dialects and gain more freedom respect the rest of linguistic and ethnic-linguistic groups in Italy)

monolingual and the pathway to diglot bilingualism might have started then.

We can start the whole educational movement with the foundation of the Académie Française in 1635. As we will see in the paragraph describing the Italian situation, despite the early foundation of Academia Della Crusca, Italy was too much fragmented a geographical area to use the same civic strategy chosen by Republican France.

However, as we already argued, ethnicity still exists in France but is not strongly related either to a demand for officialization of minority languages but for cultural initiatives which would never question the homogeneity and super unity of French nation-state.

Language Planning from Second World War on

After Second World War laws such as “Deixonne Loi” of 1951 and “Haby Loi” of 1975 proposed the teaching of regional languages in primary schools. These actions might be interpreted as a changing attitude on a “Europe of the Regions” perspective but the formal freedom to apply these laws obtained poor results as we have seen in the data provided by Fédération des langues régionales pour l’enseignement public. Central government was not interested in promoting such laws because multilingualism was seen as a disregrational force for the homogeneity of the nation state.

As Rifkin(2004:168-171) points out the success of nation-state model has much to do with the establishment of a single dominant language so people could understand shared meanings. He reports that by 1789 only 12 per cent of French spoke it correctly and in northern and southern France it was almost impossible to find any French-speaker. The standardization process

which was the tool to have a homogeneous communication mean necessitated the creation of a centralised national educational system.

Schools became homogeneity-makers and dream-makers.

In Rifkin views, students were taught to be competitive in a overall stream which aimed at making them “productive citizens” able to pursue their own interest(Rifkin, Ibidem). The personal interest in the post-modern era is the major shift from collective post-French revolution civic nationalism. Still, it is not clear where civic nationalism ends and where ethnic nationalism strikes back.

The overall concept of ethnic nationalism should be interpreted according to a Smithian vision and the cyclic shift from ethnic nationalism to civic nationalism and once the nation state is a reality to ethnic nationalism as answer to the globalizing environment which encompasses inter-groupal tensions due to the massive presence of newcomers and the new instances of historical ethnic groups which would prefer a decentralized administration in a super setting created by European identity and market forces.

***Paragraph III. French Nationalism in World War I.
Conscription***

***National Language and Experience in the Trenches
1914-1918 and the years following the War.***

Kellas(1991:36)⁴⁵ thinks that before any categorisation on types of nation building the chronological aspect must work as internal and external hierarchy factor in order to avoid reductionism of any sort.

It seems that the years of the experience in the Trenches are the years in which nation building had already achieved its goals and the Republican democracy was a democracy which worked in consultation with the vote of single citizens and the politicians were no longer considered appointed by God.

Still, the role of symbolism in personifying the republic as conveyor of identities would be a trans-chronological factor widely utilised all over the 20th century.

Some of the tools the republic had to finish its work of homogeneisation in 1914-1918 were education and conscription (the French army was a melting pot since the years of Napoleon Bonaparte).

Audoin-Rouzeau

Audoin-Rouzeau (1991: 89-100)⁴⁶ depicted the national sentiment of the french soldiers who fought in the first World War as a phenomenon which must be interpreted

⁴⁵ James G. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, MacMillan 1991

⁴⁶ Stéphan Audoin-Rouzeau, "The national sentiment of soldiers during the Great War," in Robert Tombs, *Nationhood and Nationalism in France. From Boulangism To The Great War 1889-1918*, HarperCollinsAcademic, 1991

differently from “protean nationalism” which he sees as a concept not necessarily separate from that of “traditional republican patriotism”(Audoin-Rouzeau, 1991: 89)⁴⁷.

What is central to Audoin-Rouzeau’s vision of the First World War period is the central importance of making the nation an absolute value. Audoin-Rouzeau tries to find evidence of it through the textual analysis of the sentiments of the French soldiers in their writings from the front during the years 1914-1918. It seems that the ethnic hostility towards the Germans which were often depicted as “barbarous people”. According to Audoin-Rouzeau the anti-German renaissance was to interpreted as the result of 1870 wars because there was no evidence that in the years before the 1870 the anti-German feeling had such strong ethnic connotations.

It was only during the first World War that Germans were depicted as “bouche”(a term not in use in 1870) and as being savage and deprived of any high moral value. The letters reported also an overall feeling of the leading role of France which was described as *the civilizing role of France in the world*, (Audoin-Rouzeau 1991: 96). French victory appeared never brought into questions by the soldiers who envisaged it sooner or later, but, Audoin-Rouzeau holds, the belief in the final righteous victory did not directly supported nationalism or at least it did not supported it as the memory of the 1870.

The First Deconstructivist: MAUSS

⁴⁷ Stéphan Audoin-Rouzeau, “The national sentiment of soldiers during the Great War,” in Robert Tombs, *Nationhood and Nationalism in France. From Boulangism To The Great War 1889-1918*, HarperCollinsAcademic, 1991

In the years which immediately follow that experience a very modernist and deconstructionist view stemmed from the unfinished work of an ethnosociologist of that time, Marcel Mauss (Mauss, 1920)⁴⁸ who saw societies as *un groupe d'hommes vivant ensemble sur un territoire déterminé, indépendant, et s'attachant à une constitution déterminée*, but this was not enough to have a nation as the final product. In fact he records the changes which France underwent since the changes which put the relationship between the individual and the Nation on stage. Mauss argued that the individual could then only be loyal to *la Patrie* and that the philosophy underlying the concepts of nations are different in each nation because people are different and as a consequence nations are different⁴⁹. (Mauss 1920: chapter I)

Nations are not perfect but are useful because they are the most perfect forms of societies available and their inter-differences help the whole of them to continue their development⁵⁰ (Mauss 1920: chapter I). Mauss was one of the first to understand that national language, national borders and national laws are an invention *par excellence* because the nation state was

⁴⁸ Marcel Mauss, *La nation et l'internationalisme*, 1920

⁴⁹ Non seulement les nations sont inégales entre elles, mais aucune nation moderne n'a atteint un tel point de perfectionnement qu'on puisse dire que sa vie publique ne peut plus progresser que sous une forme nouvelle et supérieure de société. Les plus élevées, celles qui se sont le mieux conduites pendant la guerre, la Grande-Bretagne, la France, l'Allemagne (j'entends celles qui ont le plus et le mieux développé leurs forces nationales) ne sont pas encore des nations parfaites ni également perfectionnées sur tous les points

⁵⁰ Les nations sont les dernières et les plus parfaites des formes de la vie en société. Elles sont économiquement, juridiquement, moralement et politiquement les plus élevées des sociétés, et assurent mieux qu'aucune forme précédente le droit, la vie et le bonheur des individus qui les composent. Et de plus, comme elles sont inégales entre elles, et comme elles sont fort différentes les unes des autres, il faut concevoir que leur évolution est loin d'être terminée.

created before the people living within the designated areas started to think of themselves like those people who had always used those language, laws and exploited and/or inhabited those territories.

This phenomenon which is indeed shared by other nation-states and also by small nations without states (eg. Sardinia) is the outcome of a nationalisation process which is very successful especially when national identity feels under attacks (Joseph: 2004⁵¹); as a result this phenomenon is shared by both ethnic nation building and civic.

⁵¹ John E. Joseph, *Language and Identity-National, Ethnic, Religious*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

Paragraph V Ethnic Forces in a Formally Civic Environment

Whenever I used and I will use in the paragraph which follows the words “ethnic” and “ethnic group” I did by taking into consideration Banton’s definition of ethnic as *voluntary association based on beliefs about a common heritage* and not as ethnic groups based on colour (Banton quoted in Kellas 1991:100)⁵² However, these concepts are not fixed and somehow intermingled; Kellas himself gave us an example of a correspondence between racial-grouping and being ethnically exclusive by quoting the attitude of the Jews in the period of diaspora(Kellas 1991:73). This “congruence” was widely explained by Smith(1999) in his chapter on the chosen people.

I am not including the racial aspect of it because in my thesis I focus on historical minorities which with few exceptions (eg. The SouthTyroler and much less the Arbëresh and the Croats) are considered historical ethnic minorities(by Law 482 1999). All the other historical minorities are being civically considered “speakers of minority languages” even if many of them consider themselves as ethnic minorities (eg. The Ladins, the Sardinians and to some extent the Sicilians).

“Racial” terms seems to be absent in French nationbuilding although some episodes of racism might have stemmed from a biased interpretation of ethnicity. When ethnicity works as 100% exclusive tool it creates

⁵²James, G Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, MacMillan 1991; Banton, M, *Racial and Ethnic Competition*, Cambridge University Press, 1983

inter-groupal divisions which overcome the traditional field of ethnic nationalism, namely the cultural and identity field to become only identity and biological. Ethnic nationalism (as we will see in the case of Germany) in the 19th century holds the pride of belonging to a small community or the pride of having a clear and ancient history and a prime literature. This works in civic nationalism as well but the access to this pride and image building is free as long as those who join the civic community will accept the rules and the identity built by that community.

However, as I hope to show throughout my thesis, racial terms are sometimes present in the Italian political discourse since the early 1990s (eg. Lega Nord party) although they sometimes underwent camouflage by advocating cultural reason to avoid immigration even from other parts of Italy but they never formally established a clear policy of independence(although Northern League in the nineties suggested the Southern Italians to have a password in order to enter the North part of Italy considered as a new nation) not to clash with the President of Republic homogeneising civic-European political efforts⁵³. These episodes, enhanced by the labourist media may have somehow prevented the language revitalization policies and the instances of devolution in other parts of the country.

⁵³ By quoting the instances of political representations by the Italian community in Croatia Ciampi declared on 14th October 2005 that he has always been addressing people for a wider political representations for minorities in accordance with the European policies, even though he does not make any distinctions that clarified if there is any political difference between historical minorities and new minorities and if Historical minorities are being considered minority at all(including those not encompassed in Law 482/99)
<http://www.ansa.it/main/notizie/fdg/200510141200216110/200510141200216110.html>

To conclude the paragraph on the development of civic nationalism in France I'd like to include an episode which shows how the Smithian process of ethnical remapping of cultural, historical and racial background is still present in nowadays France so that we can draw back to Smith's distinctions between types of social structures and philosophical distinctions(1971:197)⁵⁴

In 1996, in the Cathedral of Rheims John Paul II celebrated the 1500th anniversary of the Coronation of King Clovis, king of the Franks, who allegedly had converted to Christianity in 496 A.D.(Foy 2002: 54)⁵⁵. The *Front National*, on that occasion declared that the Coronation of Clovis was where and when the real French nation state had begun. This "ethnic" statement was done only in the name of an allegedly German origin of the French nation-state regardless of the fragmentation of ethnies and origins to be traced far back in history and regardless of the state language which quite misrepresent the Clovisian origin of the French nation. For all these regions, those who try to find a specific ethnic reason for their claims are regarded as ethnic nationalists at better or racists at worse. Were the Ultra conservative claims trying to find a common tie, a friendship by blood or a link based on blood as found in a legal document of the eleventh century from Île de France which described "amitié charnelle" based on blood relationship as the *princes* of the relationships (Bloch 1962: 124, volume I) ⁵⁶by the fact that the ancient provinces of the Meuse and the

⁵⁴ Anthony Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, New York, Harper & Row, 1971

⁵⁵ Sorchá Foy, *Reversing Language Shift in France: The Breton Case*, B.A. thesis, University Collge, Dublin, 2002

⁵⁶ Marc, Bloch, *Feudal Society, volume I, The growth of Ties of Dependence*, translated from the French *La Société Féodale*, by L.A.Manyon, Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD, London, 1962

Rhine were integral parts of the kingdom founded by Clovis? (see also in Bloch 1962, volume I). This episode may well clash with a form of civic nationalism based on territory rather than kinship and feudalism which became state-religion in France from the French Revolution on.

Anthony Smith, assumed that nations once formed were real communities of culture and power: *circumscribed, but potent, unifying, energizing, constraining*, (Smith 1999: 164 quotes Deutsch, Kedourie, Gellner among the others)⁵⁷. By doing so the component of the nation could be put in a blender and through this exercise of social engineering give birth to the prototype of modern nation whose ingredients were fixed and not possessing any emotive symbol and myth. Indeed Smith thinks that the construction of the emotive part started in the period 1870-1914, when we assist to the first revival of ethno-nationalism which could now be massively traced in the print media (Smith 1999 quoting Anderson and Hobsbawm: 165). The ethnic “Call of the Wild” is a process which has never ceased because it is a strong component in the modern nation building process. The sentiment of revanche against Prussia can be in turn a sentiment pro-Prussia and of revanche towards civic nation building and economic-social condition which may lead someone to feel under attack and find to reduce the virtual borders of nationship as in the following example of new sentiments towards a constructed collective particularity in order to avoid the total loss of feeling “universal” and distinct from the organic civic nation-state. Nationalism is eternal in the

⁵⁷ Anthony, D., Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, Oxford University Press, 1999

process of setting new historical birth back in history in order to feel secure and “Pan-Xsh” in small environments.

Nationalism and Pop Culture from post World War till nowadays

Nationalism and the issue of its alleged antiquity is a issue which never ceased to be a central core in the study of nationalism (Smith 1998: xi)⁵⁸. The Ethnic communities exists today in society as a whole. From Feudalism to Modern Age the elites, the rulers, often chose inter-groupal marriage but, especially from the eighteen century on, they systematically tried to construct a policy of social-ethnicity by acting themselves as symbols or by finding a symbolical past in accordance to all the social forces of the society of that time.

Through the visual and print media, the social representation of a shared ethnic past still resists. “Asterix” may be a very good example. A Galoise, creation of an assimilated “Roman”(son of Italian immigrants Albert Uderzo 1927-), who from the 1949 on worked on the creation of super heroes(such as Kapitein marvel who reminds us of Captain America) which have always been present as pop cultural conveyors in those nation states who adopted a policy of civic nationalism but nevertheless the line between an ethnic hero and a civic-hero is not clear since their main aim is the same: creating social ethnicity both in an environment(eg. a small nation) with many ethnic characteristics in common and in other larger environments where not many ethnic characteristics are

⁵⁸ Anthony, D., Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: A critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*, Routledge London and N.Y., 1998.

in common but there is a strong demand for it. The success of the latest issue of Asterix(34^o issue) which in few days was sold out relies both in its symbolic resistance (in the past he represented the resistance against the Roman invaders whilst nowadays represent the resistance against the Americans pro-Bush invaders who are represented as space aliens.) and in its ethnic function: it communicates that a group exists because it is exclusive. To be exclusive a group must share important features; if these characteristics are not present and there is demand for them (either it be an economic and/or strategic demand) they are likely to be created. Still the ethnic group may be “constructed” such as a fair large one: in Asterix’s world fictional groups as French, Germans, Nederlanders, Spanish, British, where described as all-Celtic even with their different physical appearances. This macro-group made out of fictional ethnicity responds to the rules of French or American civic nationalism given the quest for a period of whole unity and a fictional diminished inter-group distance despite the “blood” differences. Small Racial ethnicity is transformed in social or civic ethnicity with a degree of internal variety not sufficient to speak of “different” people but sufficient to assure ethnic-diversity in a homogeneous cultural or social setting.

Pop culture works as conveyer but cannot give all the participants(readers and non-readers) the right to withdraw from the social ethnic community. One of the problem inherent to the theory of nation building is the lack of explicit declaration about its use by official media. In this cultural environment the right of the single citizens to have their own rights protected individually are denied.

2.1.5 Ethnic nationalists: History of Germany

Before the Prussian led unification German states could be defined, by using Kellas' words as a *loose collections of sovereignties and bureaucratic polity* (Kellas 1991:36). In the paragraph dedicated to Italian nation building some analogies between Bismarck and and Cavour's policies will be quoted and briefly expounded with particular attention given to the post-“quiet” years(1850s, Gorman 1989: 54)⁵⁹. Yet, some of these analogies will find place in the present paragraph. For what nation building is concerned my main framework will be Smith's work again because some the features of nationalism he have explained throughout his entire work respond well to some of the characteristics of French, german and Italian civic and ethnic nation building.

First of all in Smith's view we may distinguish between what are the cultural roots to nationalism and the political manifestation of it (Smith 1995:52)⁶⁰.

The small nations had their movements for autonomy between the late 1890's and the 1960's but as far as Smith is concerned their cultural roots can be traced as far back as early nineteenth century just as in the case of many “bigger” Western nation-states. In this case Nationalism theory holds that the world is divided into nations each of which has its unique destiny and national character and that the individual or the citizen must be loyal to the nation he is related to (Smith

⁵⁹ Michael, Gorman, *The Unification of Germany*, Cambridge Topics in History, Cambridge University Press, 1989

⁶⁰ Anthony, D, Smith, *Nations And Nationalism In A Global Era*, Blackwell Publishers Inc, Polity Press, 1995

1995:55). Given that modern nationalism was the offspring of the nineteenth century, Smith argues, they rely on pre-existing ethnic ties stemming from ethnic groups which dwelt in an X area (Smith 1995: 57-60). These ties are the basis for many contemporary instances of devolution and/or independence coming from small nations without a state but they were also present in the form of “lateral” ethnies in medieval ruling classes and as vertical or demotic ethnies which are more compact and widespread as in Germany and in Italy in the years of their formation. Vertical or demotic ethnies, according to Smith, can also be “peripheral” which would not be the case of Germany in 19th century. Smith wrote that “*Germany*” as a cultural identity was created in the process of forging the Zollverein and the Bismarckian Reich, so the “*European identity*” will emerge from the active will and deliberate planning of clear-sighted and strong-minded leaders and elites (Smith 1995:126). In contrast with my opening some scholars don’t think German nation building was similar to Italian nation building. According to this view, in Pre-unitarian Italy⁶¹ the Realm of Piedmont-Sardinia had already adopted a constitutional monarchy and the role of chancellor was not the pre-eminent figure⁶². Another difference between Italian and German nation building would be the Italian peninsula in 1870 was already perceived a territory “ethnically and geographically homogeneous” by the politician whilst German could not claim the same (Candeloro 1967:15). Candeloro’s statement

⁶¹ When we take into consideration the views of Italian scholars on German and Italian nationalism we must understand that the majority of the texts available in the 1990s were written by anti-fascist authors who depicted the Italian nation as both civic and ethnic (eg. Candeloro 1967:15)

⁶² Giorgio, Candeloro, *Storia dell’Italia Moderna. La costruzione dello Stato Unitario 1860-1871*, volume 5, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1994

seems finding no confirmation if we looked at statistics which reports Italian language as being spoken by a tiny minority at that time and the “Questione Meridionale”, a rooted form of violent protest against centralization which was often labelled by Italian liberal-conservative governments as criminality tout court.

Chabod reports that many Italian journalists of that time who were members of the moderate conservative government party following the unification of Italy did not agree with German vision of the “Alsatian issue” because they claimed that on this basis the “the vote of the people and the consciousness of nations” would be missing. Scholars such as Mommsen and Strauss had an ethnic vision of why Alsace was to be German: it shared a language, a race and historical traditions. Late herderian 18th century vision was the philosophy underlying those concepts as mankind derived its nutriment by the land which in turn shapes the human character’ It is quite important that Herder(quoted in Dahbour 1999:49) does not appeal to biological or racial categorization to define the backspin of what a homogeneous group should be thought. He holds that Earth (eg.climate) may be the cause for physical changes. Complexion is not therefore seen as important as the physico-geographical history of man. A foreign climate may also change man’s attitude towards colonialism (Herder gives the exemple of an Arab in “Reflections on the Philosophy of History of Mankind” quoted in Dahbour 1999:50). Herder’s vision is profoundly rooted both in *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis*. This material features creates nations together with a distinctive language. These features are considered as real whilst Mill saw nationality as a portion of mankind which is united by common sympathies (John Stuart

Mill, "Considerations on Representative Government" in *Three Essays on Religion*⁶³ quoted in Dahbour 1999: 98). Mill himself does not exclude shared sentiment of a common race, language and descent. He tried to epitomise the Law of nature by examining human actions as exertion of natural power which responds to law of nature. The issue on whether the subjects or governed can decide on government was dependent on the possibilities for a multi-national country to have free institutions. Mill doesn't think multinational states as Austrian state of that time can assure their citizens equal rights and laws (Dahbour 1999:101): even France is not considered homogeneous but still Mill admits the possibility for one nation to include all the other nationalities within the country. From the on is a question of reconciliation which can be done by "loving the country". This love is a sentiment which should shift from the single nation to the love of the enlarged country which comprises all the nations. Prussian nationbuilding may have encompassed those civic characteristics as soon as Prussia tried to enlarge according to geographical and economic desires rather than tribal ones. Maybe the main point in German history is that the German nations already had a stronger cohesion than France for example which Mill defined as divided into two main nations: namely the Gallo-Roman and the Frankish and then also into the Burgundians and other "Teutonic races" (Mill quoted in Dahbour 1999: Ibidem).

In the Italian vision influenced by Mazzini's thought, a nation wasn't either an enlarged territory or a group of people speaking the same language but an organic system with a unity of ends and faculties. Language,

⁶³ John Stuart Mill, *Three Essays on Religion*, 1874 (published one year after his death)

race and territory are only a sign of nationality intimately blended in the historical tradition and in the development of collective life.

Thus, Chabod holds that Germany developed its nationalism in a more ethnic way than Italy which seemed more influenced by Civic nation building and by the Father land, the *Patria*, seen not as a geographically entity but as an historical repository of collective traditions and shared memories and values.

Some of the Italian views of German nation building were an objective analysis of a main difference in the social background which gave birth to the German nation state. For instance, Francesco D'ovidio (1874) saw Italian nation state as an entity supported by a less dynamic but more powerful middle class whilst saw Germany as an entity supported by a middle class which was strong in terms of economic power but which had less political power if compared to the *Junker*, the aristocratic German class. The Italian views on the German issue were contingent to the political situation from 1870 onwards but it was shared by **Max Weber** who wrote that it was very dangerous that a class, such as the Junker, whose economic power was declining, kept the political power. The permanence of power in the hands of such an elitarian class would prevent citizens to have contact with the monarch. Still, Weber downsizes the role of German bourgeoisie in the creation of the German nation and he does so by blaming bourgeoisie political immaturity rather than Junkerian concentration of power.

Schulze

According to Schulze (1991:35)⁶⁴ the background of German nation building must be seen in the demographic problem. In a century, between 1750 and 1850 the people living within the future 1871 boundaries of the German empire were double in number. They were around 17 million in 1750, 25 million in 1800, 35.4 million by 1850 and then 56.4 by 1900 and 67 million by 1913. Germany was in line with European increase. The European population was 468 million people before the First World War and 130 million people in 1750(Schulze 1991: 35). The causes for this demographic explosion may be found in the changes in the agriculture production which led to better harvests and therefore people were better fed and more resistant to disease. The agricultural sector and its landowners could benefit from the rising demand which England had: this was due to English industrialization which led England to develop on foreign grain (Greenfeld 2001:187)⁶⁵

Greenfeld holds that the commercialization of agriculture and the emergence of the rural proletariat proceeded apace.

The collapse of the feudal system had its influence because people could now marry earlier and have more children. However, despite the massive agricultural production the steady population growth was seen as a clear danger for the system which was inevitably predicted to collapse (Malthus, quoted in Schulze 1991:36)

⁶⁴ Hagen Schulze, *The Course of German Nationalism. From Frederick the Great to Bismarck 1763-1867*, Cambridge University Press, 1991

⁶⁵ Liah Greenfeld, *The Spirit of Capitalism. Nationalism and Economic Growth*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 2001

The French Republican revolution was applauded by the German elites until the news of the subsequent murders and terror spread out leaving the educated class astonished (Schulze 1991:48) According to Baycroft (1998:20)⁶⁶, by 1870 almost all the absolute monarchies of Europe had a constitution which either reduced their absolute powers or cancelled them. Yet, the growth of population was counterbalanced by the spread of means of communication and transportation so that the perishable goods could be brought to more distant regions before being deteriorated.

The German Unification starts with a confederation and ends with a more powerful confederation. Baycroft(1998:18-21) was obstructed by Frederick William III of Prussia, which was the largest of the German states, because he was concerned with the maintenance of Prussian unity and absolute power as well as the strong alliance with Austria. However, he was in favour of strong economic bonds within the German states as a whole and therefore he pushed forward the removal of internal customs barriers between 1834 and 1838(Baycroft 1998:19). The general uprising started in 1831 when the news from Paris broke out in almost every German capital. The liberals and the democratic-radical were demanding more freedom of the press, of assembly, legal political parties, and the establishment of civic militias and what's more, they demanded a German National Parliament (Schulze 1998: 70). That happened before each German state had its own *Zollverein* and its currency. As seen in the study

⁶⁶ Timothy, Baycroft *Nationalism in Europe 1789-1945*, Cambridge Perspectives in History, Cambridge University Press, 1998

quoted in 2.1.4 by Audoin-Rozeau⁶⁷, before the wars with Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866 and 1870-71 nations were often allies in the struggle to obtain national unity because the common struggle was meant to free people from the absolutism. The national movement was definitely established when the Prussian monarchy changed and Wilhelm IV was replaced by Prince Wilhelm (Schulze 1991: 82). Some scholars prefer to insert the birth of German nationalism as an issue which was inextricably bound to the economic liberty or at least the economic liberty which was in the minds of the Prussian reformers (Greenfeld 2001:194)⁶⁸. Yet, in these last years of the fifties the good economic environment of the beginning of the decades was slowing down. At the same time Napoleon III with the allegiance of Piedmont-Sardinia were menacing the German boundaries such as the Rhine ones which were Napoleon's aims to re-establish "natural" borders for France. In 1859 the German National Society was founded by Liberals and Democrats. The leader was Hans Victor von Unruh who was the former president of Prussian National Assembly (Schulze 1991: 85). German National Society was shaped on the traditional German associations of middle classes, crafts etc, but it encompassed elites instead. These elites did not need to propagate an idea of a regional or little Germany (Schulze 1991: 86).

⁶⁷ Stéphan Audoin-Rozeau, "The national sentiment of soldiers during the Great War," in Robert Tombs, *Nationhood and Nationalism in France. From Boulangism To The Great War 1889-1918*, HarperCollins Academic, 1991

⁶⁸ Liah Greenfeld, *The Spirit of Capitalism. Nationalism and Economic Growth*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 2001

This was a turning point in Prussian-German nationalism. The Liberal ideals did not clash with a concept of a united Germany largely dominated by a trans-national Prussia as foreseen by Westfalian professor Julius von Ficker. The clashes were highly relevant also in the University arena because there was an audience. At the beginning of the 1860's The National Society underwent a major change: the Prussians' ideal now lacked supporters and the future leading role of Prussia was now being questioned. The idea of a German central authority was uprising and by 1866 the pan nationalist policy seemed to be the only appealing one at least in the eye of the National Society's print medium (Schulze 1991: 88). After 1871 the demand of a German nation-state was well established and the next two generations saw it as an inevitable necessity (Schulze 1991: 89).

Habermas & Europe

Habermas⁶⁹ (1992 quoted in Dahbour 1999:336) thinks that modern civic nationalism stemmed from the reconciliation of republican ideas and larger territorial states. He divides the concept of ethnic nationalism and civic one quite clearly by using much of the categorisation present in Smith although in more a deterministic way: *After 1871, Renan was only able to counter the German's Empire's claims to the Alsace by referring to the inhabitants' French nationality because he could conceive of the "nation" as a nation of citizens. The nation of citizens does not derive its identity from some common ethnic and cultural properties, but rather from the **praxis** of citizens who actively exercise their civil rights. At this juncture, the republican strand of "citizenship" completely*

⁶⁹J.Habermas, "Citizenship and National identity; Some Reflections on the Future of Europe," in *Praxis International* 12:1(April 1992: 1-18) Blackwell Ltd.

parts company with the idea of belonging to a prepolitical community integrated on the basis of descent, a shared tradition, and a common language. Viewed from this end, the initial fusion of republicanism with nationalism only functioned as a catalyst (Dahbour 1999:334). What is important in this kind of community is the personal commitment to the institutions. Yet, this does not solve the problems related to contingent economic world.

Habermas himself holds that backspin of modern nation state was that given the form, modern trade could flourish from it. Still, Habermas thinks, there is no direct relation between democracy and capitalization (for the reasons I have mentioned by quoting Crouch 2004). In fact, capitalist shareholders may be aborad-based but still influence the territorial entity which we qualify as nation state. In the case of Bismarckian Germany, the capitalist borageoise strengthen the internal economy by building a wide system of infrastructures and steel productions under the political guidance of the Junkers. If we compared that situation with nowadays Germany we may think that nationalism needs new categories which cannot be linked to the national territories given the economic non-state forces. Still, European Union works as an umbrella to keep these forces and the cash flows within the European borders which are the new enlarged ethnic-civic borders.

2.2 How did Italy become a nation state and what this mean for Sardinians

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Italy was nothing more than a geographical expression as reported by chancellor Von Metternich (Baycroft 1998: 18), but this assumption contains only a part of truth since the geographical expression had been united at least by a romantic ethnic nationalism which was present in the work of the finest Italian writers and poets, who, to a certain extent (eg. Manzoni) played an important part in the political unification of Italy. In this chapter I won't go back to renaissance or to the fact that even in small nations within foreign nation states (La Corse)⁷⁰ a sentiment of Italian identity was conveyed by literature many years before the process of unification and this shared identity was rooted on Renaissance. From the Renaissance on and even in the *Signorie* age Italy was part of the collective imagery as the offspring and remains of the Roman Empire whose history was almost the only history studied in schools for centuries.

The whole Italian Unitarian process took place in the years 1849-1871. Candeloro inserts this period on a 25 year span which encompassed many economic changes: a steady rise in the market prices, a quick development of industrialization and world wide commerce as well and a tendency to adopt free market strategy(Candeloro

⁷⁰ Alexandra, Jaffe, *Ideologies in Action, Languages Politics on Corsica*, Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin.New York, 1999. It is very interesting to note that Jaffe reports some episodes which shed some light on the relationship between rural class and literature. Jaffe holds that in 17th century Corse it was possible to hear farmers and sheperds perform Venetian author Bembo's lyrics and Ariosto's lyrics by heart.

1967: 18)⁷¹. What Candeloro is not implying is that things can be seen on the other way round: the changes in the market, the need to overcome internal domestic economic barrels led to see unification as a priority in order to shift from agricultural to industrial society. This process of industrialization was less quick and widespread than in Germany, France and England. The economic perspective will be an important factor to take into consideration in order to understand the contemporary instances of devolution which stem from different economic background as *Tri-Veneto* (Lombardy, South Tyrol and Veneto) and Sardinia.

However any instance of devolution whether it be in the print media or in the parliament is idealistically grounded in an economic-free nationalism. For this reason I must include the philosophical thought of some of the politicians who strove for Italian Unification in the 19th century by building on Civic French Nationalism.

Italian Nation Building

Rupert Emerson's definition of nation quoted in Williams (Colin H. Williams 1994: 21)⁷² may now appear much generic to summarize the many features often encompassed in the current definition of nations among scholars of 20th century: *a community of people who feel that they belong together in the double sense that they share deeply significant elements of a common heritage and that they have a common destiny for the future*

This idea conveys the idea of a association of people who have decided to share the idea of a common

⁷¹ Giorgio, Candeloro, *Storia dell'Italia Moderna. La costruzione dello Stato Unitario 1860-1871*, volume 5, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1994

⁷² Colin H. Williams, *Called Unto Liberty! On language and nationalism*, Multilingual Matters 97, Clevedon, 1994

heritage and build their destiny for the future. It is still a partially holistic view because the autonomy of the single is not clearly defined although it can be inferred. Still, Emerson did not seem to consider nationalism as an independent phenomenon which relies on autogenesis. It is quite amusing that Emerson's definition was produced in the same years of the above mentioned problems which Corsica dwellers experimented in coming to terms with the lack of ethnic congruence which 20th century societies (but also medieval societies) implied.

The lack of an analytic perspective on the issue of the social representation of borders and minority groups may be well grounded in the traditional teaching of geography.

The idea of nation from the 1830s on either it be defined as *Volkstum* term that conceptualises the idea of a nation as a natural and necessary fatherland, or it be nation as spiritual community or the Renanian *plebiscite de tous le jours*, nation was a turning point, however not immediate, which favoured the innovation in terms of dynamic factor of change of the idea of what is a territory and what the study of the territory may be useful for. The realization of the nation state in the 19th century has been still influenced by the old motto drawn from the protestant reformation "cuius region eius religio". The old statement became *cuius regio eius lingua*. However the question of the necessity of a distinct language seems to be different by that of the need of a distinct identity or territory.

Giuseppe Mazzini

In Mazzini's thought the nation was personified or equalized to the people and it became the foundation of all legitimacy and legality. Religion had to play a strong role in his nationbuilding both for the moral frame which in his view should play a major role and for the possibility of domestic nationalism to be strengthened by a universal category such as religion. Mazzini was one of the first to work on collective imagery and sentiment and the issue of morality was a civic category which would prevent no-one to join the nation he had in mind. We may think that Mazzinian super-categorisation decreed the Italian peculiar transition from ethnicity to nationalism because categorisation relied on a common culture (rather than a common tradition) and civic associationism but still, categories as state-religion are widely considered "ethnic" by many modernist scholars. His first attempt to define a nation as "Single, Independent, Free and Republican" was issued in 1831 as a formal request to Carlo Alberto of Savoy. Mazzini was Marseille based at that time and from there he thought of Europe as a super political and moral frame for free national states. In 1834 he founded the "Giovine Europa-Young Europe" which was a branch of the "Young Italy" and it extended its political thought in Poland, Germany and Switzerland. Mazzini's thought spread like wildfire from North to the South: Piedmonte, Liguria, Tuscany, Abruzzi and even Sicily. Mazzini's nationalism, if we used Kellas categorization (Kellas 1991:72) can be seen as a western European Classic nationalism ethnically inclusive, so that any citizens was thought free to live in a chosen territory, but with a strong prenational consciousness rooted in literature and in the perception to a common Roman descent. Mazzini was aware that to achieve commitment he had to rely on

massive support from the urban work classes, urban bourgeoisie and the over-exploited “army” of southern (the large Two Sicilies area included half of the Italian peninsula) share-croppers which were the backbone of vast rural Italy. Basically there were two Italies to unite. Mazzini believed in republic and its own experiment was the Roman Republic in the heart of Papal States, which lasted only four months but hosted the first universal elections which were held on 21st of January 1849. The Pope was confirmed in his right to continue his role as head of the Roman Church. Mazzini, who was part of the second triumvirate in charge of the newly proclaimed Republic, would distribute Church's large landholdings to peasants. He proclaimed freedom of the press, secular education. Things changed quickly and after an initial resistance led by Milanese Bersaglieri (who had forced the Austrians to withdraw from Milan), Garibaldi's forces, and many people from all over the peninsula tried to defend Rome. On the 29th of June of 1849 the French army entered Rome and asked the Pope to proclaim a general amnesty in order to avoid any subsequent bloodshed. Napoleon asked the pope to establish Napoleon code which had to become the background of Italian Constitutional Monarchy “Statuto Albertino” and Republican “Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana.” A main point was the demand for secularization which was to be part of the struggles between a laic and religious nation state which would shape Italian political identity over the following century. The Pope returned in Rome in 1850 but Italian nation building was in progress.

The Italian nationalists were influenced by the liberal Mazzinian thought but the political struggle which began in the early 1820s was not able to reach the masses in order to obtain territorial unity, a constitution and independence. From the 1840s on the strategy was to pursue economic links between small states by building the first railways to join the different areas of the peninsula together. This was similar to what the Prussian reformers had in mind during the German unification.

A.Lovati (Lovati-Singapore 1998: 194)⁷³ quotes⁷⁴ Italian pre-unity thinker and politician Giuseppe Mazzini (Lovati 1998:105, 1872) “*A Nation is the association of all those men that form a single group by language, geographic conditions, and by part assigned them by History, if they accept the same principle, and under the same rights the aim together to the pursue of the same goal. The members harmony in the deeds and the active participation of all the faculties of the individuals which are implied in that association built to pursue the chosen aim forms national life*”(my translation). In Mazzini’s thought we find much of the French post-

⁷³ A.Lovati, L.Singapore, *Eurocivica 2002*, Fratelli Ferraro Editori, 1998: Una Nazione è l’associazione di tutti gli uomini che, per lingua, per condizioni geografiche, se per la parte assegnata loro nella Storia, formano un solo gruppo, riconoscono uno stesso principio, e si avviano, sotto la scorta di un diritto comune, al conseguimento di un medesimo fine. La concordia nelle opere e l’attivo concorso di tutte le facoltà individuali che si racchiudono in tale associazione a raggiungere il detto fine, costituiscono la vita nazionale”.

⁷⁴ A.Lovati, L.Singapore, *Eurocivica 2002*, p.194: *Una Nazione è l’associazione di tutti gli uomini che, per lingua, per condizioni geografiche, se per la parte assegnata loro nella Storia, formano un solo gruppo, riconoscono uno stesso principio, e si avviano, sotto la scorta di un diritto comune, al conseguimento di un medesimo fine. La concordia nelle opere e l’attivo concorso di tutte le facoltà individuali che si racchiudono in tale associazione a raggiungere il detto fine, costituiscono la vita nazionale.*

enlightenment philosophy but still we find the same concept of individual freedom within the community that we may find in nowadays Elster's theoretical framework whose vision is grounded on methodological individualism, a Nation state cannot but be based on the individual human action, which can be mainly qualified as rational and egoistic (Elster 1989 a & b)⁷⁵. Edward Carr too qualified Mazzini's thought about nationalism as if Mazzini thought of them as "sublimated individuals" (Carr 1994: 244)⁷⁶. The personification of the nation was an abstraction because it was the basis for giving the nation its psychological identity.

Beginning of 20th century: needs for Geographical definition

Yves Lacoste⁷⁷(Lacoste, 1991:29-31) affirms that geographical discourse in schools has not been an empirical discipline. Lacoste thinks that teaching geography in late 19th century and in the first decades of 20th century maps consisted in presenting the Nation as an inviolable data, something whose form is given, something presented not as related to history or policies; the geography of the nation-state seemed *fixe* and generated by nature. In those years the geographical term "Pays" was a holistic general word which was a substitute for "Patrie" and "Frontière". Lacoste thinks

⁷⁵ Jon, Elster, Nuts & Bolts for the Social Sciences, Paperback, Cambridge University Press, 1989; **The Cement of Society: A Survey of Social Order (Studies in Rationality and Social change**, Paperback, Cambridge University Press, 1989

⁷⁶ Edward H. Carr, "Three Phases of Nationalism" in Hutchinson & Smith, *Nationalism*, Oxford University Press, 1994

⁷⁷ Yves, Lacoste *Crisi della Geografia, Geografia della Crisi*, Italian edition by Pasquale Coppola, Franco Angeli, 1991

that such a process is a symptom deriving from the unconscious desire not to quit the idea of an ideological conception of the nation state: a shield, a defense, in order not to cope with the clashes between national ideology and reality. In 1915 Mussolini defined the Nation as “Patria”, patrie or fatherland. He saw it as a living entity, and depicts it as something which exists, which is real, which is immortal

In those years the word “Pays” is no longer considered *opus certa* but it has become an ambiguous term defining both the physicalness of nature and its geological features; on the other hand “Pays” included all the ethnological aspects related to those inhabiting its territories. During the fascism, in Italy, this term was strongly related to that of people as we can see in Giotto Dainelli’s *Paesi e Genti* in 1934. In the years of the First World War the cutting edge idea was represented by the concept of Region. According to De Agostini (De Agostini 1915)⁷⁸, natural borders were thought as **natural** and impossible either to “penetrate” or “violate”. Concepts such as “Patria” or “Foreland” were equalized to the concept of “natural borders” (Lacoste 1991)⁷⁹

Sardinia in the First World War: building an Italian identity

The island quitted its status of isolated land since the First World War on. About 1/8 out of the whole Sardinian population took part in the First World War (In 1921 Sardinians were 859.000) and the young soldiers who fought the War were about 100.000. 14%

⁷⁸ Quoted in Lucio Gambi, *Uno schizzo di Storia della Geografia in Italia*, Torino, Einaudi, 1973, pp.3-37.

⁷⁹ Yves Lacoste, *Crisi della Geografia, Geografia della Crisi*, Italian edition by Pasquale Coppola, Franco Angeli, 1991

of them died. The number of dead was the highest given the fact that Italy as a whole reported 10% of dead. The high number of dead and casualties contributed to create a multilayered feeling of nationality: on the one hand the homogeneity of the groups sent to fight by the Italian “Stato Maggiore” created strong feelings of intra-group solidarity among different social classes. It was the first time Sardinian farmers and urban work class were together under Sardinian officers⁸⁰. These officers were to become an elite which would create the ruling political class in Sardinia after the First World War. Some of them, such as Emilio Lussu, went on to create the first nationalistic party in Sardinia, a party created by former soldiers who, once the war was over, wanted the land to be redistributed because many of them were farmers. On the other hand Sardinians ceased to consider themselves as a group extremely marginalised because it was the first time that Sardinians openly shared the destiny of the still young Italian Nation. Regional pride was to be enhanced in order to create a powerful brigades but also to rise the level of commitment to Italy as the place where Sardinians were equals or more brave than the others. The traditional media had a strong part in it. Newspapers’ headings such as <<*Gli Intrepidi Sardi*>>⁸¹ that meant both <<the brave and fearless Sardinians> were often drawn from official nation reports on the war operations. The sense of pride in elite corps create homogeneity among 95% of its components who were workers, craft-workers, shepherds and the tiny minority of middle-class and lower middle class who were often reserve officers; among them professionals,

⁸⁰ Francesco Artizzu, Barreca, Boscolo et Al., *La Società in Sardegna nei Secoli. Lineamenti storici*. ERI-EDIZIONI RAI RADIOTELEVISIONE ITALIANA, Torino, 1967.

⁸¹ Francesco Artizzu, Barreca, Boscolo et Al., *IBIDEM*, p.257

clerks, accountants, lawyers, young graduate and undergraduate students. Upper middle class did not exist⁸²

⁸² Francesco Artizzu, Barreca, Boscolo et Al., *IBIDEM*, p.258

2.2.1 1861-1873, top down standard; the question of the standard as main tool to create a homogeneous nation once the nation state was created. The arena hosted two groups of competitors: those in favour of a complete and rapid standardization that meant to get rid of any dialect within the Italian-Romance continuum (the Southern dialects were the ones at stake) and those who would have preferred to keep the dialects for educational purpose

Almost fifteen years before the unification the standardization of the “nation to be” was a problem already widely debated among the academic elites but it was the first time this problem was an important issue which found much space in the media and in private-mailing which for the first time in history became public-mailing.

Soon after 1861 the question of standardization became a paramount political issue. As Rifkin⁸³ pointed out ten in the first years following the unification only 2.5% of the Italians could speak it fluently.

Manzoni and Graziadio Isaia Ascoli and D'Ovidio who later on tried to blend the two opposite theories

First of all we must take into consideration that these theories (especially Manzoni's) were created top-down⁸⁴. That means the government formed many boards in order to find an Italian standard and these arouse more than one turmoil. It is very interesting to

⁸³ Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream*, New York, Tarcher-Penguin 2004

⁸⁴ Alessandro Manzoni, “Lettera a Giacinto Carena sulla lingua italiana,” Milano, Redaelli 1847; “Lettera intorno al “De Vulgari eloquio” in *Perseveranza*, 21th march 1868; “Lettera intorno al Vocabolario,” in *Perseveranza*, 20th April 1868 *L'Appendice alla elazione*, Milano, Rechiedei, 1869, “Lettera al marchese Alfonso Della Valle di Casanova, Milano, Rechiedei, 1874

note that at smaller level it is happening the same with the top-down Sardinian committees sponsored by the Region in order to develop a standard. In both case, earlier proposals were always based on conservative documents because “ancient” was an important parameter to assure the language its purity, and in the case of Italian, its label of dialect-free. Manzoni as Ascoli wanted a variety based on written texts and the variety chosen was to be rooted in “ancient” or high-register Florentine. Manzoni himself in the foreword of his masterpiece *I promessi sposi* declared using powerful imagery to have been washing its clothes in the Arno river in order to mean he had to polish his language in Florence before he was able to write a single word. Isaia Ascoli’s vision⁸⁵ was more sociolinguistic. He suggested to implement bilingual grammars so that the new Italian citizens could learn standard Italian with the help of their native languages. This proposal was rejected by the Parliament whose deputies and senators thought that for rural areas the best thing to do was not studying grammar at all. By doing so they institutionalized an educational divide between rural schooling and schooling in the urban areas. This on the one hand has affected Italian educational system for many decades and on the other hand has not created an additional obstacle to the standardization process and to the creation of a nation-building tool based on civic homogenising nationalism.

Schooling and Italian language

⁸⁵ Graziadio Isaia Ascoli was a Furlan Jew. Despite his knowledge of some minorità languages his attitude towards these languages was a liberal open attitude which still did not define them as “real languages” but only dialects. It is clear that in that time dialects were already perceived as sociologically not convenient

According to the first Survey(1861)⁸⁶ conducted in the Realm of Italy after the unification many people were not able to write in the Italian language at all. Candeloro(1994) reports few stats that indicate a good 78% of the population as being illiterate. This percentage is 75% if we consider also Lazio and Veneto. Sardinia stands as the place with the highest percentage of analphabetism (90%); Sicily (89%), Continental Southern Italy (86%), Umbria(84%), Marche (83%), Emilia-Romagna (78%), Toscana (74%), Lazio (68%), Veneto (65%). It is important to note that the survey did not included(only surveys from 1951 on did) data on the number of semi-illiterate people which according to Candeloro(Ibidem: 56) was probably very high. Ninety years later after the second world war and before the great economic shift took step in Italy, those who were completely illiterate were 12% and overall the 58% of Italian people had not attended but few years of primary school without completing even the first stage of regular education⁸⁷. Primary education worked differently in the urban areas if compared to the poorer urban area. In the first years of Italy as a unite state only 0.8% of the young population (people whose age bracket was 18-23)(TALAMO: 347; Candeloro:57) had attended any secondary school. One third (TALAMO 1864)⁸⁸ out of them may have attended the University, that means 6.500 university students between 1861-1864 (Sommario ISTAT 1861 and TALAMO 1864).

⁸⁶ Giorgio Candeloro, *Storia dell'Italia Moderna. La costruzione dello Stato Unitario 1860-1871*, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1994

⁸⁷ G.Mammarella, "L'Italia del <<miracolo economico>>", in A. Desideri, *Storia e storiografia 3, dalla prima guerra mondiale alle soglie del Duemila*, G. D'Anna, Messina-Firenze 1992.

⁸⁸ Carlo Matteucci, *TALAMO, La Scuola della Legge Casati alla inchiesta del 1864*, Milano Giuffrè, 1960, pp.58-67, 197-348 and 320-325.

The question of literacy is still open today in Sardinia and there is much debate whether the Region should invest public money on Sardinian language planning. Those who do not think that Sardinia is not convenient to be learnt for economic reasons sometimes display the data on school drops and literacy. 23.9% of Sardinian students still fail to complete the high school⁸⁹, and 23.2% of students between the age of 6 and 19 abandon their studies, thus qualifying as the worst of the Italian regions in terms of school drops and education⁹⁰. The problem of the languages of the minorities were far from being considered by public bodies and the parliament even at the end of the 80's. In 1989 the most widely used text for civil education (*La Società Civile*)⁹¹ to be taught in the Italian High schools wrote that Italian citizens aimed at a unite language in order to spread a common culture to such different people. According to this authoritative source, the Italian language, before the media became "mass media" had only a written standard known by a low percentage of educated elites. The authors points out that Italian standard was reached after

⁸⁹ Oriana Putzolu, data displayed in *Sardegna News*, 25th August 2005. The same news is reported by *The Unione Sarda* of 26th August 2005, p.8 "Scuola Sarda, persi 5.000 posti". According to the news in the Unione Sarda the number of teachers was cut down and Sardinians choools have five thousand teachers less than in the year 2000. Trade Unions(CISL) think that this may influence school drops.

⁹⁰ Nevertheless the University of Cagliari is reported as the 361^o best University in the World according to *Academic Ranking of World Universities* 2005, by the University of Beijing, being at the same level of the University of Aberdeen or Bath and Essex. However at the time of Unification, Sardinia had already two well established Universities Cagliari and Sassari, which were founded between the 1533 and 1626 (Sassari obtain the Official Legal Status as Royal University in 1617 whilst Cagliari obtained it in 1626). The church was in charge of the incoming institutions even before they were officially appointed as Universities by Philip III(in fact the University of Sassari was already active in 1561 when Philip II allowed the Gesuits to hold their courses)

⁹¹Ugo Piscopo, Giovanni D'Elia, *La società civile. Corso di educazione civica*, Ferraro,Naples, 1989

few decades from World War II thanks to the media which have influenced Italian lexicon to a good extent drawing handfuls of terms from regional dialects (which are never defined as languages) and everyday language especially those dialects of central Italy, namely Florentin and Roman, whilst the grammar and the writings remained less flexible but nevertheless open to those contaminations coming from the language used by traditional media.

Devolution in Post World War II

However, former partigian and minister of Education, Tullio De Mauro (1987: 42)⁹² points out that the safeguards of language rights should not result in a pure and mechanical debunking of linguistic oppression: *un puro e meccanico rovesciamento dell'oppressione linguistica* and he goes on calling the readers not to fulfil any nationalistic demand because nationalism claims the right to protect each and every language as a separate entity from all the others: *Il nazionalismo pretende di proteggere una per una le lingue da tutte le altre* (De Mauro 1987: p.45). De Mauro attitude limits the possibilities which in theory heteroglossia may offer and the minority language is seen as a non functional tool because the language is depicted as an embalmed one which lives in the ghetto instead of widening the possibility of communication: *al limite estremo, dei ghetti, che salvano forse idiomi imbalsamati [il caso del celtico in Irlanda], ma condannano i parlanti all'immobilità* (De Mauro, Ibidem, p.46). It is clear that even among the most open and

⁹² Tullio De Mauro, *L'Italia delle Italie* Roma, I Cerri Riuniti, 1987

democratic personalities among the cultural and political elites, language is seen as a code, and minority languages are seen as a social threat because they may strengthen group solidarity instead of a larger inter-group solidarity. This attitude was the same which led not to mention of minority rights in the Charter of the United Nations(1945) The supranational laws granting equal access to job position may be in contrast with regional charters promoting minority languages. When De Mauro published his theories the European Bureau of Lesser Used Languages was already operative and was financed by the Commission but again many problems were linked to the fundings(Wright 2004:194-195). Arfè resolution was echoed only by regional print media and it did not effect either National or Regional(in Italy did not bear any consequence even in the autonomous regions) and if we gave a look to the Italian lack of consequence it is difficult to think that the results obtained by Catalan *Generalitat* were granted by the initiatives taken by the European Commission. Networks such as EBLUL which was established in 1998 had more a role of monitorizing and describing the state of arts in those nation states where minorities were present. The nation states in those years were still more focussed in giving any citizen the same right seen more as economic rights. In 1958, (Wright 2004.190) *the International labour Organisation Convention gave the framework to challenge unfair distinction in employment.* This may well clash with the laws granting privilege status to those citizens who speak German in South Tyrol. Macro bodies have proven to be inadequate to analyze and find the better solution in order to save International relationship, national homogeneity, and municipal matters. Sub commissions and informal

policies where the answer to the demand for more dedicated strategies. The safeguard of the rights of the minorities were addressed separately only in 1992 in “The Declaration on the Rights of persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities”(quoted in Wright 2004: 191)

This was the milestone which shift the attention to a municipal level notwithstanding the problems derived from the requirements(eg. a participative consensus in order to actually implement the law) and from the lack of fundings which are a rule. Therefore the European member states now formally protect ethnic or national identities in their territories and formally encourage the promotion of such diversities, but in practice, at least in the case of Italy, the burden is on the Regions(given the fact that the majority of the minority languages are present in the Autonomous Regions with few exceptions) who have in turn to protect minorities within the minority and promoting schooling and cultural network in order to maintain the language and promote the use of the minority language in public bodies.. Italy was one of the first nation states to have adopted the Charter for Regional or Minority languages but the standardization process has often been delayed by those activists who require the right for any citizen within the minority to be taught his own micro variety. In the case of Italy this implied a total stall with the exception of South tyrol who had could benefit from standard administrative German in public bodies. But again, this may be described as a Gellnerian exception, because Germany, as a nation state and as work language has always strengthen the position of german speaking minorities in any member state. The Charter for regional language had not an extensive effect in Italy, especially

under Berlusconi's second government which encompassed a strong anti-European anti-Italian anti-immigration ethnic minority party such as the Northern League which enhanced the perception of danger within ethnic activism which is often equalized by the print media as a form of Paleo Nazism (Furio Colombo in *W Zapatero*, Sabina Guzzanti 2005). After ten years from the establishment of the Council of the Regions, policies on minority languages are linked to the fundings and the will of the nation states and the role of these bodies are widely unknown to the audience. The Council of Europe Language Policy focused on language teaching as a practical tool to convert diversity into a source of wider communication and social glue. The national governments are asked to take steps to enhance effective communication exchange. This led to include many international master joint programmes for e-government or language teaching, but still, this had the result to improve English language learning because it was convenient for the learners and less expensive than diversification. A recent survey published in the most important Italian print media (*Corriere della Sera*) showed how Poland is the nation state whose schooling system dedicates more hours to the study of English and the Italian state is one of the worse in these terms. This attitude "against" the development of good skills in the English language is socially despised and is given much space in the Italian national media far beyond any consideration given to minority languages. The pledges for linguistic diversity which have the form of Recommendations are up to member states to apply. The Bureau, in 2002, asked for more financial commitment and for a patronage in order to turn the Recommendations into operative laws (Wright 2004:196).

Some European bodies for the safeguard of minority rights are also present in non-European states. OSCE(Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) is widely known because it was known as an organisation whose original aim was to prevent conflicts and managing crisis(CSCE). This organism must not be mistaken for OEEC(Organization for European Economic Cooperation) which was an organism in charge of distributing the annual payment of American aid which took place after the 1947 Paris Conference which gave birth to a 16non-Soviet Bloc European state joint reconstruction programme(Dorman-Treacher, 1995:31). The focus on internal European security was becoming a non paramount issue and therefore after the fall of Communism OSCE became OSCE(Cherter of Paris for a New Europe), (Wright Ibidem.197). This organisation tried to support the new demands for self determination but this principle was to be seen on a background of territorial integrity of the states(Wright Ibidem quoting Shaw 1997). These geographical limitations within the minority rights were to be solved by the Geneva Expert Meeting(Wright Ibidem) in 1991. On that occasion it became more clear that minority rights are not to be considered as internal affair under exclusive nation state regulations. It was the first time the period of reconstruction and political stabilization was not seen as a barrer for the promotion of national rights and national minorities. Still, Lund Reccomendations(1999), (Wright 2004.198) on the one hand had to be conform to the immigration laws of each member state. On the other hand they don't distinguish between authoctonous rights, and the rights of the new citizens or of those citizens who are considered *alien*. Again the European laws tend to promote group rights

without making much distinctions between those to which the law is addressed. Wright(Wright 2000)⁹³ explains how organisation and economic problems will be insuperable if all the languages spoken in the European community were operative as work languages. In this stage the echoes of the years following 1945 when the future of all the regions of Europe seemed worrisome and not favorable seems long gone. Dorman-Treacher observed in 1995 (Dorman-Treacher)⁹⁴ the period between 1945-1989 was defined *a posteriori* a period of economic reconstruction and stabilization (Dorman-Treacher:30). After World War I European states weren't able to extend their peace agreements and lack of rivalry much longer than the Paris Peace Conference even the new important actor in the world arena, namely the USA had pushed forward to find long term agreements (Middlemas 1995)⁹⁵. Any fire of rivalry is carefully delimited and smoothed, often with the external influence played by the USA, as in the case of Austrian opposition to enlargement to Turkey which was solved in less than 24 hours(3rd of October 2005). The fragile policies of main European legislative bodies such as the Council of Ministers which agrees, amends or rejects the *Commission's proposals for legislation*(Middlemas 1995: 266-285) may have played a major role in the outspread of informal policies for minority rights. For example, in the case of the Council of Ministers, the Council meetings are attended by all 25 members(at the time middlemas published

⁹³ Community and Communication. The Role of Language in Nation State Building and European Integration, Multilingual Matters, Clevedon, 2000

⁹⁴ A.M.Dorman, A.M. & Treacher A., Croft S., *European Security. An introduction to Security Issues*, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1995

⁹⁵ Keith Middlemas, *Orchestrating Europe. The Informal Politics of European Union 1973-1995*, Fontana Press, 1995

Orchestrating Europe they were 15), but are in a way less important than plenary European meetings. Middlemas reports on the peculiar situation determined by the lack of decisional capacity played by Italian ministry of Foreign Affairs which leave room to personal links created by singular ministers or Institutions (Middlemas gives the Foreign Ministry of Banca d'Italia as an example). The room left for singular initiative is seen as a possible cause of the growth of the Northern League (that I have mentioned above) which, according to Middlemas, was inspired by Catalan and German Länder model. After ten years we may say that Northern League instances are far from being fit to be compared to Catalan European policies and German ones. In fact the League was 'on the pitch' as Berlusconi's allies in the second Berlusconi's government which is still on in 2005. From 1996 on, according to Ginsborg (Ginsborg 2001:323)⁹⁶ until Berlusconi's second overwhelming victory, Italy could give the necessary priorities to regional and European policies. Under the 'Olive Tree' labour coalition government Italy approved Law 482/99 which gave equal status to 12 minority languages at regional level. This long term programme ceased in May 2001 when, after Berlusconi election, fundings for the application of Law 482/99 were systematically cut down.

2.3 Conclusion: The Situation in Europe in early 20th century: A Mosaic

The situation in Europe in early 20th century is a mosaic which encompasses the following elements:

⁹⁶ Paul Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents 1980-2001: Family, Civil Society, State*, Penguin Books, 2001-2003

- Political boundaries
- Fixed Territories
- National languages
- National markets
- National armies-Conscripts
- National culture

These elements created minorities

Passage from Feudal system to Nationalism

Fixed territories

In 1763 Rosseau wrote “When a country is not peopled by colonists, it is the nature of the soil that gives rise to the original character of the inhabitants” (“Constitutional Projects for Corsica” by Jean Jacques Rosseau 1763 in *Social Contract volume II*)⁹⁷ Rosseau’s *Projet* is defined as a manifesto of romantic nationalism. In the pre-industrial era money and trading is not seen as the paramount issue by Rosseau who sees Corsican richness in the arms of its offspring. Good arms for a rural system which is being considered the only one adapt to the firm of democracy that la Corse deserves. *L’Île de Corse ne pouvant s’enrichir en argent doit tâcher de s’enrichir en hommes. La puissance qui vient de la population est plus réelle que celle qui vient des finances et produit plus sûrement son effet. L’emploi des bras des hommes ne pouvant se cacher va toujours à la destination publique, il n’en est pas ainsi de l’emploi de l’argent; il s’écoule et se fond dans des destinations particulières; on l’amasse pour une fin, on le répand pour une autre; le peuple paye pour qu’on le protège et ce qu’il donne sert à l’opprimer. De là vient qu’un État*

⁹⁷ The two volumes are contained in Vaughan’s edition of 1915 called *The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rosseau*

riche en argent est toujours faible, et qu'un État riche en hommes est toujours fort. Pour multiplier les hommes il faut multiplier leur subsistance, de là l'agriculture

Rousseau thought empty spaces meant weakness and ungovernability. The lack of balance within geographical spaces was considered generators of inequalities. So the cities and the city dwellers should not in any case have the supremacy on the free farmers and the rural areas and the long hatred Genoise conquerors themselves were seen by Rousseau like those who gave the *incipit* to Corsican civilization given the fact they had tried to introduce more modern agricultural technologies which were unknown to the insider. *Pour que toutes les parties de l'État gardent entre elles autant qu'il est possible le même niveau que nous tâchons d'établir entre les individus, on réglerait les bornes des districts, pièves et juridictions de manière à diminuer l'extrême inégalité qui s'y fait sentir. La seule province de Bastia et de Nebbio contient autant d'habitants que les sept provinces de Capo Corso, d'Alleria, de Portovecchio, de Sartène, de Vico, de Calvi et d'Algagliola. Celle d'Ajaccio en contient plus que les quatre qui l'avoisinent. Sans ôter entièrement les limites et bouleverser les ressorts on peut par quelques légers changements modérer ces disproportions énormes.*

Such an approach doesn't make sense now if we considered how the migratory movements have changed the conception of urban spaces. Nowadays the majority of European (and North American) citizens are city dwellers. Cristaldi (Cristaldi 2004:218)⁹⁸ affirms that in Denmark 85% of people are considered city dwellers, 90% in UK, 97% in Belgium, and 67% in Italy (in North America, 76% in the USA, 78% in Canada).

⁹⁸Flavia cristalli, "Urbanizzazione" in *Le Parole Chiave Della Geografia*, Carocci, 2004

Any study of national groups and territory should take into consideration the rapid and massive growth of urban areas which outnumbered the rural ones in Italy only over the last forty years and more precisely in the years 1965-1980. In the years 1954-1975 Corsica underwent a strong French capitalist penetration (Williams 1994:98-101) which intended to smooth once and for all the turmoils in Corsica by trying to create more capital and employments. As a consequence the internal areas could not benefit from the same investments on construction and tourism and agriculture which were flourishing along the coastlines. Moreover (Williams, *Ibidem*), the best positions were administrated as a sort of prerogative right which only continental French and foreigners had. The French government sent many unskilled workers from Algeria and other immigrants came from Spain thus lowering work costs. Many Algerians were called "pied-noirs" the term used to identify European-Algerians of French and Jewish descent (Albert Camus was one of them). This massive immigration created many tensions and gave rise to the creation of strong nationalist organisations. It is very interesting how, non-Corsican born inhabitants were 45% in 1975 (Williams quoting Kofman 1982:305) and only 10% in 1954 (Kofman, *Ibidem*).

21th century insight on National culture present on the media : a blend of civic and ethnic nationalism with some cases of racism and wide ethnic exclusion

In some nation states the elites managed to incorporate the minorities as in Republican France whilst in others they remained a group apart (apartheid in South Africa is an example of extreme marginalisation). In Italy the situation is not clear although the Italian Constitutional rights grant equality to Italian citizens and human treatment and human rights to immigrants. Article n°3 is clearly inspired by the *Declaration of the Rights of Man* (1789) and reads as follows: *all citizens are equals before law without distinction as of gender, race, language, religions, political opinions, social and personal status*(Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana, articolo III, 1948). Article n°3 1948 is very similar in its attitude to article 2 paragraph 1 of the universal Declaration of Human rights. In this way the sense of solidarity which is the social glue that makes 1992 Capotorti's definition of what a minority is

There is evidence of a dual discourse going on in the Italian institutions over the last few years. The concept of ethnicity is often used to define Italian group as a whole especially when the group is depicted as if it were under attack especially by the recent immigratory wave.

Throughout my work I will give evidence that concepts such as race rather than symbolic ethnicity are being used in the political discourse and are reported by the media even in a country, such as Italy, where the commitment to European Union is very strong. As Joseph (2004: 166; 198) and Hastings(1997) have analysed the concept is a pattern often related to politics

and religion. The political patterns can be analysed at least by dividing the issue in three levels. The case of Italy is a very interesting one because the “historical” minorities are nowadays assimilated in the nation state and the proof is that the freedom to maintain and spread some specific regional languages and cultures is not being exploited by those citizens at regional level. At national level, a nation state as Italy, which is a lay state uses its most powerful religion to loosen its cultural bonds to a good share of its immigrants who are often equalized to their religion especially when they are muslims: immigrants=strict muslims. These words were uttered by The President of the Senate of the Italian Republic, Pera⁹⁹ on the 21st of August, declared that “we should strive to integrate the immigrants who come to Italy because they must become **citizens of our civilization**, they **must have our education, our language, our knowledge of history**, they **must be sharing our principles and values or the match for integration is lost. They should quite their culture to become Italian**. What Giddens (2001:336) defines as new racism or cultural racism is here and it was already depicted by Huxley and Haddon in the years before the Second World War¹⁰⁰. Huxley and Haddon could not work on the same data which we have available today but they were able to show very clearly how the eugenics studies were political artefacts and the concept of nation was to be keep separate from that of race.

⁹⁹ “No a un Occidente di Meticci,” in *La Repubblica*, Monday 22th August 2005, pp.4-5

¹⁰⁰ Julian S.Huxley, A.C. Haddon: *We Europeans: a survey of “racial” problems with a chapter on Europe overseas* by A.M. Carr Saunders, J. Cape (1938), Life and letters series. Italian translation: *Noi Europei: un’indagine sul problema razziale*, Edizioni di Comunità, intro by Cavalli-Sforza

Nation was to be intended as a vast array of socio-cultural features and they had nothing to do with ethnic characteristics

2.4 At the beginning of the 21st century instances of devolution seems able to assure more power to the regions than in the past? What about the former autonomous regions? What about devolution in the Italian political arena?

The attempts made by governor Soru in 2005 to produce a standard Sardinian language for administrative acts in few weeks can be seen as related to the new proposal for a Sardinian Constitution at the end of September 2005. Much of the proposal for a new Sardinian Constitution try to strengthen Sardinia's freedom to have economic relationship with other European regions or even nation states despite the form of devolution chosen by Berlusconi's executive power which in order to accomplish to the Northern League¹⁰¹

The language doesn't find much space in this law proposal as much as the rights deriving by birth, family tradition, cultural, economic and social bonds with the territory and the other members of the community(Sardinian community): *Art. 2 (Comunità regionale). La Comunità sarda è costituita dai Comuni, dalle*

¹⁰¹ In 1996 the Northern League party withdrew from the coalition who won the elections in 1994(Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale, UDC, Lega Nord) thus determining the break up of the executive power which was undertaken by Romano Prodi first and then by Massimo D'Alema. The Northern League had withdrawn because the government did not implement any proposal which favoured more devolution in the Northern area. Devolution has never included Sardinia or other regions which were already autonomous (with the exception of South Tyrol) in 1948. According to many activists and scholars the Northern league devolution will eliminate the differences between former autonomous regions and "normal" regions. The only regions to gain from such a corpus iura will be Lombardia, Veneto, Trentino Alto Adige.

Province e dalla Regione. Ne fanno parte gli uomini e le donne che si riconoscono in essa per nascita, per tradizione familiare, per legami di natura culturale, economica e sociale con il territorio e con gli altri componenti della Comunità

Sardinian proposal and Catalan proposal have in common the importance of the land as identity conveyor, but lack of racial or even of ethnic components to be defined a member of the community are present in both proposals but, historically, Civic Catalan nationalism has been more effective than Sardinian one which was always fragmented in a myriads of small parties. Furthermore, language planning appears secondary in Sardinian proposal and also the capacity to draw on a common history (this factor being both ethnic and civic) to legitimate any form of self government.

Generalitat did it in article 5 (historical rights. Els Drets històrics). *L'autogovern de Catalunya com a nació es fonamenta en els drets històrics del poble català; en les seves institucions seculares i en la tradició juridical catalana, que aquest Estatut incorpora i actualiza a l'empara de l'article 2* ; we may take into consideration that even in the new proposal, the Italian language is the only language to have legal value. Both proposals stem from Regional or Autonomous government and not from their nation states but, Sardinia seems to try to overcome the dictates of the Italian Constitution by trying to re-design its importance in the European economic arena regardless of the historical roots of self-government and corpus iura in Sardinia (Giudicati age-Carta De Logu of the real of Arborea) which may seem to “historical” to be actual and may be a tool seen as less powerful than market and European network.: *Art. 9 (La Sardegna e l'Unione*

Europea) 1. Per la realizzazione di un'Europa unita, la Sardegna collabora al processo di integrazione europea, informando la sua azione al rispetto dei principi democratici e dei diritti sanciti nei documenti costituzionali dell'Unione Europea.

2. La Regione sarda, in conformità alla Costituzione ed allo Statuto, concorre alla determinazione delle politiche dell'Unione europea, partecipa alle decisioni dirette alla formazione degli atti normativi comunitari che la riguardano e provvede all'attuazione ed esecuzione dei relativi accordi internazionali e comunitari

Elster (1989 a: p.135) clarifies that “Labor” alone doesn't produce any value. The benefit is within the cooperation. A society must find a mechanism to divide benefits from cooperation. A pattern of social norms are encompassed in nation building which is a shared and an open-source code.

Colin Crouch¹⁰² stresses the concept that nowadays European democracies which in the 50s and 60s were correspondent to actual practice in Britain and USA are being considered *liberal* democracies which reach their peak in electoral participation as the correct form of mass participation, extensive freedom for business lobbies and an overall form of polity which won't interfere with a capitalist economy. These concepts were moreless developed in the same way by Ginsborg (2004)¹⁰³. Ginsborg assumes that the development of the state in Europe over the past few decades has followed a

¹⁰² Colin, Crouch, *Post-democracy. Themes for the 21st century*, Polity Press Ltd, Cambridge, UK, 2004

¹⁰³ Paul Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents 1980-2001: Family, Civil Society, State*, Penguin Books, 2001-2003; *Silvio Berlusconi: Television, Power and Patrimony*, Verso, London-New York, 2004

dual trajectory, namely vertical and horizontal (Ginsborg 2004:213). On the vertical axis, according to the author, the modern state increased its power and network by getting involved and bound by supra-national European or transnational institutions and organizations. On the other hand, it is clear that the habitual practice of the bureaucracy depended to a notable extent upon the exercise of discretionary power on the part of the functionary (Ginsborg 2001: p.216). Thus, a massive participation doesn't mean successfully application. The form of democracy whose only ambition is stressing the right of the citizens to vote their representants and the reduction of the number of items managed by opposite teams of professional communicators is what Crouch and Ginsborg call post-democracy. Crouch criticize the egalitarian approach because in his opinion does not take seriously that politics are slipping back into the control of privileged elites in a way similar to pre-democratic times, as long as democracy and government re-distribute society's wealth. Crouch thinks that this form of democracy does not grant re-distribution of wealth.

Other Nations such as Sardinia and Corsica had a minor role throughout industrial era even if, especially in the case of Sardinia, there is much evidence of a past strategic importance as conveyor of raw materials. But that position seems to be far too back in the time line and as a form of "immaterial" Bourdieuan capital it seems that Sardinia hardly could profit from that whilst the Catalan-Aranese hegemonic position in western Mediterranean area which lasted more than two centuries seems to have provided the credentials to talk of the Catalan situation as something involving much more than a minority group or a nation without state. It

is worth noting that as McRoberts reports (McRoberts 2001:122)¹⁰⁴ *Catalan nationalists have argued, with reason, that the strength of Catalan culture necessarily depends on the presence of the Catalan language and culture in all the various forms of mass communication that impinge upon people's daily lives. Many minorities in Italy face immense difficulties because they lack fundings for gain visibility through the traditional print and visual media*¹⁰⁵

Official bodies such as the Generalitat are available on-line and official documents are also available.

In September-October 2005 in Catalonia and in Sardinia many efforts were done which resulted in radical changes of regional statute laws. The doctrine of the autonomy of the individual is dependent on the wider group which proceed in compliance with Regional policies. It comes as no surprise that the new proposal for the Statute of the Generalitat(30th September 2005) it is written in Catalan whilst the proposal for a new Sardinia Regional Statute is written in Italian. That is because laws giving status of co-officiality to the Sardinian language are still largely unapplied and, more important, even in this new proposal, the only legal documents are documents presented in the Italian language. On the 26th of September 2005 the Royal Galician Academy formally made its protes through its spokesman Don Ján Figel, member of “Departamento de Educación, Formación. Cultura e Mulilingüismo da Comisión Europea

Catalan Nation Building

¹⁰⁴ Kenneth McRoberts, *Catania. Nation Building Without A State*, Oxford University Press, 2001.

¹⁰⁵ There are estreme examples published nowadays in some scientific quarterly of how the visibility gained thourgh visual media affects audience brains

Catalan successful nation building policies provide a possible explanation of how many years of imposition of Nationalism can lead to a new form of Nation Building once the former power abandons the elites who played the role of the rulers. In the case of Catalan, for example, the dictatorship of Franco which lasted in 1975 may have indirectly given a great hand to the development and renaissance of Catalan language and political autonomy which followed. It seems that Franco could never lead the Catalans to a stage of forced removal of their identity or of the oppression they suffered in order to share a new vision of themselves as Spanish. Or, if this happened, it seems to have happened for a minority given the relative facility with which Catalan language was re-admitted as work language in the public bodies or how they achieved the use of it in schooling and mass media. If there was no reasonable demand there wouldn't be such a quick reprise. Still, Spanish Nation building took its toll, since in absolute terms, it seems that Catalan speakers have dropped from 75% of the whole Catalan population in 1940 to 68% in 1968 and 60% in 1975 (Generalitat de Catalunya 1992)¹⁰⁶. What is much impressive is that, although nationalism and nation building are concepts which according to many scholars belong to modernity, a nation such as Catalonia was in charge of a small empire during the 14th and 15th century. The expansion of Catalans over sea continued successfully even in a period, the 14th century, when Catalan mainland underwent some major economic troubles. Still there were Catalan citizens and non-Catalan citizens in Catalan Mediterranean domains. Catalans were the

¹⁰⁶ Generalitat de Catalunya, *The Catalan language today*, second edition, Barcelona, 1992.

elitist minorities who had all the rights. I am not talking of the synchronic presence of a multinational class of traders(Genovese, Pisans, Jews, Catalans-Aranese) who were present in the cities conquered by Catalonia; I am talking of the noble vassals and bureaucratic classes which were considered citizens. Whether they believed in any form of civic nationalism is hard to discover (in their Sardinian possessions Catalans were the first to give Sardinians the possibility to have a parliament) it is sure and documented how these classes were very busy in making money from taxes so that they could reinvest in either in the conquered land or at home, among their peers

In Catalunya schooling in Catalan has become a priority which has much contributed to reverse language shift. Many Italian and European communities such as Sardinian and Occitan do not seem to be able to arise the demand for language shift or to push local communities to use the laws available in order to ensure the development of school programmes in the Regional language. It seems that somehow the revalorization of culture, the remapping of the importance of a Regional culture, the rediscovering of long lost traditions, the re-writing of ancient history is an instance easier to pursue if compared to language planning

In 2005 Prime Minister Zapatero decided to grant Spain's regional languages official recognition in the future European constitution. If the EU agrees to Madrid's request, Catalan, Basque and Galician will be awarded "treaty status" thus allowing Spanish regional languages to gain or re-gain public domains. This policy may also benefit an overall visibility of Spain as a multicultural nation state and as a "good" nation state allowing much independence to its historical minorities.

The situation in a pre-1999 Sardinia recalled that of Franco regime years where was hardly possible to listen to any radio stations broadcasting in Catalan. Radio broadcasting in the Sardinian language is hardly heard even today despite a labour government in favour of the standardization of Sardinian language and as a consequence much of the efforts are stemming from a network of web activists who volunteered in trying to establish a written and spoken standard through the web and small independent radios.(For an in-depth insight into the spread of minority languages through the web see chapter five and Wright 2006¹⁰⁷)

However in the case of Catalan it seems that the role of the Internet in the maintenance and revitalization of Catalan language is a secondary consequence of a primary massive demand for print services(eg. newspapers) in the Catalan language. For this reason, many Catalan print newspapers implement their on-line version which is usually for free. This also happens with Sardinian newspapers written in the Italian language (even though the more conservative “Unione Sarda” is no longer available for free whilst the lefty and more pro-Soru(Soru is the labourist Governor of Sardinia and also Tiscali tycoon) “Giornale di Sardegna” has got a version available for free on-line and it is also delivered daily to the emails of those who chose this service free of charge. We will see in the chapter dedicated to the Internet how in the case of those few portals in Sardinian language they tend to conform their communication to be aliken an electronic magazine or newspaper but they lack funds and incomes from

¹⁰⁷ Sue Wright, “The Internet, language diversity and language standardisation,” in *Journal of Language and Social Studies*, Benjamin, January 2006.

publicity etc because they lack visibility and this is the reason why the activists authoring these sites try to build networks with traditional media. The results reached by another minority without a state, namely Wales, which obtained BBC Wales to produce six hours of Welsh language programs per week were not reached by Sardinian RAI3 which despite law 482/99 wasn't able to produce a single hour of language programs. Hadyn Williams who was the director of education programmes in two important Welsh secondary schools in Flintshire found the way to broadcast to many areas out of reach of the English national transmitters. This is another example of how the application of a formal right depends on elitarian initiatives. Williams's initiative was successful and private channels such as TWW and later on Harlech television took over and extended the project and it is worth noting that was ten years before Britain join the "Europe club" and nineteen years before Arfè recommendation. The demand for services in the Welsh language represents a background for more demand for devolution. One important step was the Scotland and Wales Bill of 1976. But the demand for devolution in Scotland shared its destiny with Wales only until 1997 and the successful endorsement of the referendum for the devolution in Scotland in 1997 encourages my idea that the obtainment or non-obtainment of more self-government through devolution are not directly linked to language policies or minority language spread. As a result Scotland seems no longer a Nation without State even if other nations without state(eg. Sardinia, Friuli, Valle D'Aosta, Catalonia) have a Parliament but in David Arter's view (quoted in

Shepard-Cairney 2005:304)¹⁰⁸ a new balance in the power sharing seems to have created a new model of governance in Scotland based on a more participative model which basically shares its powers between the Executive, Parliament and People. Again Shepard-Cairney think that the term “People” must include “within society”. “Within society” may include the actions taken by the committee system outside the Parliament and therefore “within society meaning and including the whole people and the single steps taken by the individual. In chapter five when I write about new media such as Internet it will be clear that some of those websites can be seen as electronic committee working independently and virtually sharing no power with Sardinian Parliament even because the Sardinian Parliament doesn’t ask for the committees’ approval in deciding on the Legislative output. The analysis of the failure of the Scottish referendum on devolution of 1979 may lead us to reflect on the role of the media and large public support in shaping a new social representation of the role of the small nations within a super European nation state. Dardanelli(2005)¹⁰⁹ analysed the relationships between a call for Europeanisation and the needs for Secession but still it doesn’t necessarily explains why this phenomenon did not take place in Wales even though similar tendency, namely, to favour and identity grounded on a solid European nation building is a message carefully given out by non-traditional media,

¹⁰⁸ Paul, Cairney, Mark, Shepard, “The Impact of the Scottish Parliament in Amending Executive Legislation,” in *Political Studies*, Volume 53, Number 2, June 2005, Political Studies Association and Blackwell Publishing

¹⁰⁹ Paolo, Dardanelli, “Democratic Deficit or the Europeanisation of Secession? Explaining the Devolution Referendums in Scotland,” in *PoliticalStudies*, Volume 53, Number 2, June 2005, Political Studies Association and Blackwell Publishing

political activists and labour government in Sardinia with the direct efforts and personal views of the democratic process made by pro-economic Globalization Tiscali tycoon Soru. Dardanelli confirmed that the referendum which ended in the rejection of the Scotland Act was not biased by the conservative voters who although in favour of devolution perceived it as a Labour-biased referendum even because in 1979 Labour's popularity increased in the general elections (Dardanelli 2005: 322). The different outcomes may be a consequence of the increased British involvement with the developing European Community and with two main factors which could be also interdependent: a more widely consideration given to ethno-linguistic issues and the outstanding supremacy of English as only real working language throughout European Community as well as its supremacy as second language in all the other European member states (Italian data on all the initiatives taken towards the use of English in all European member states within the European Community-ISTAT 2005). The Wales Bill of 1976 gave it not many legislative powers and that is a main difference with Scotland and again, the Welsh media reports the same fears of labour-dominated assembly which were advocated for Scottish failure in the referendum of 1979. Dardanelli describes what can be considered a milestone in the changes of attitude towards devolution in Scotland. In the 1979 vote supporters of devolution preferred it to the status quo and preferred the status quo to independence. In 1997, there was a radical change, in fact, supporters of devolution had independence as second preference and the *status quo antes* was only the third choice (Dardanelli 2005:327)

Language and autonomy have often been related through Catalan History. Today, we cannot consider Catalan as a real minority language but as a well established language in a Nation without a State. Many fears of language activists in Catalonia seem not to stem from the pacific field of civic nationalism but to that of ethnic nationalism. In fact as Hoffmann reports(Hoffmann 1999)¹¹⁰ quoting Hooper 1995, it seems that only half of the citizens resident in Catalonia are of Catalan descent. Given the low birth rates which Catalonia shares with other European industrialized countries, it is foreseeable that by the year 2040 there won't be any Catalans of Catalan blood at all(Hoffmann 1999: 56). The high immigration rate, due to the economic growth of this area, and consequent heterogeneity in families (M.Strubell 2001:262)¹¹¹ will tell us more about activists' fears of Catalan autonomy seen as dependent on the transmission of Catalan in families rather than schooling.

Hoffmann enhances this aspect which, according to her informants, constraints the spread of Catalan language as first language in Catalonia.

The first time the Catalan language underwent a period of Renaissance was in the 30's of the 19th century. This crusade was a Romantic one led by scholar elites. The difference with the Renaissance which took place in the Langue D'Oc area is the political roots of it which aimed to gain more autonomy from the Spanish Nation State. The effort to gain a considerable degree of autonomy was reached from the 1914 to 1923

¹¹⁰ Charlotte Hoffmann, "Language, autonomy and identity in Catalonia," in Smith-Wright *Whose Europe?* Blackwell Publishers, the Sociological Review, 1999, pp.48-78.

¹¹¹ Michael Strubell, "Catalan a Decade later" in Josgua A.Fishman, *Can threatened languages be saved?*, Multilingual Matters, 116, 2001.

(Hoffmann 1999)¹¹² McRoberts¹¹³ argues that the Catalonia's experience is less well known than it should be because it is a 'stateless nation' within Spain. As such he sees it as a good example of the way 'historical forces' underlie nationhood, as an exemplar of civic nationalism in an economically successful progressive region and as a potential precursor of 'region states' in an era of globalisation. Catalonia also shows the limits of stateless nationhood, given that many Catalans 'reject outright' the 'basic tenets' of Catalan nationalism, that normalisation of Catalan has had only a mixed success, and that 'the Spanish experience would suggest that it is difficult to maintain asymmetrical arrangements if there is no recognition of the underlying multinationalism that makes them appropriate.

Even the limited sovereignty of a formally federal state seems to remain out of Catalonia's reach given the continued strength, if not resurgence, of a Spanish nationalism that rejects the claims of the historic nations within Spain and an endemic suspicion of federalism throughout much of Spain's political leadership

The first legal person to have decided to present its official charter in 1978 was F.C. Barcelona which for the past fifty years had always pushed forward Catalan nation building and as a matter of fact “Les Corts” stadium and later on “Camp Nou” stadium was the only place where Catalan language and identity was tolerated by Franchists. Nowadays one of the major issue in the political arena inc atalonia is whether Catalonia should have a representative national football team or not (such as Scotland for instance). As argued by Williams 1994

¹¹² Charlotte Hoffmann, IBIDEM

¹¹³ Kenneth McRoberts, *Catalonia: Nation Building Without a State*, Oxford University Press, 2001.

(1994: 145)¹¹⁴, *The long gradual experience of developing bilingualism, and of appropriate structures for the lesser-used language in Wales, offers some models for imitation elsewhere and the grounds for co-operative ventures at all levels, viz. educational practice and research, quasi commercial agencies, the media, structure planning. Furthermore...the nation-state system is not necessarily sacrosanct. Before independence or devolution the “revolution” consists in considering normal and positive having bilingualism and biculturalism.*

In 2005, Catalonia and Sardinia too were trying at the same time to gain more legislative powers.

With its new proposal Catalonia tried to gain more international value and recognition to its status of autonomous community and since the *Preàmbul* of the whole proposal issued on Monday 3rd October 2005, Catalonia is “La Nació Catalana”, Catalan nation whilst Sardinia defines itself “La comunità Sarda”, “Sardinian Community” thus shifting from the past “Autonomous Region of Sardinia. Catalan is defining itself not as a minority group which wants to be recognised as a nation but as A nation that time after time has become conveyor of multi-generational energies and different traditions and cultures which found Catalonia a welcoming Land “*La Nació Catalanas’hat anat fent en el decurs del temps amb les apptacions d’energies de moltes generacions, de moltes tradicions I cultures, que hi han trobat una terra d’acollida*”; so it is the LAND which welcomes other cultures; over the last sixty years Catalan activist and then after Franchism, Catalan Generalitat has focussed their policies on civic nation

¹¹⁴ **Williams, Colin H.**, *Called Unto Liberty! On language and nationalism*, Multilingual Matters 97, Clevedon, 1994

building. But to do so, Catalonia had to define its physical and cultural borders, its language and culture then it was time to welcome other languages and cultures: *Catalunya ha definit una llengua i una cultura, ha modelat un paisatge, ha accolit també alters llengües i altres manifestacions culturals.*

According to the *Preàmbul* Catalonia has developed its own system of laws and freedom and has developed a “brand” or a “label” of solidarity and tolerance(*convivència solidari-convivenza solidare* in Italia) whose aim is the social justice. The traditional Aranese minority is now perceived as a minority which needs protection and not as a peer minority within the Spanish state. Catalan generalitat is asking for a status much more similar to that of an independent nation state(*article 1: catalunya és una nació*) that that of a strong, independent community within a nation state:.

Catalan Nation Building in the 19th century

The first experience of **Catalan Federalism** began in 1868 with the dethronement of Isabel II in September 1868 and it lasted six years (Balcells 1996: 28). It must be clear that Catalan aspirations to self-government were widely shared by the mass correspond to the model postulated by Hroch¹¹⁵. In fact it was only when the first free elections by male suffrage regardless of the class

¹¹⁵ M, Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. A comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (translated by B.Fowkes), Cambridge University Press, 1985

that the Federal Republicanism won. Guibernau (Guibernau 1999:97)¹¹⁶ wrote that to establish federalism successfully in Catalonia or in Quebec or in the Basque Country or in Scotland a large portion of the working class must feel to be engaged actively in the process.

The successfully establishment of federal policy in Catalonia in the 1868 had nothing to do with ethnic identity. In fact, although Keating and Balcells himself, hold that Catalan identity had originated in the 11th century A.D., as soon as the Catalan vernacular differentiated from Latin (Keating)¹¹⁷. In modern age, especially the Marxist critics of the sixties, retained that may have lead to a massive demand for Federalism (although according to all the scholars above mentioned almost no-one in Catalonia thought as positive to be totally independent from Spain and its markets) is the industrialization process which at the end of the first half of the 19th century created a wide divide between Catalonia and the rest of Spain..

However, (Balcells: 21), Catalonia was hardly represented in the parliamentary arena and the liberal state seemed to be more centralist that the absolute monarchy (Balcells: Ibidem).

In the nineteenth century Catalonia could took part into the Spanish international arena of Americas from which Catalan traders were excluded until the late 18th century(Keating 2001: 142). The Marxist critical attitude of the sixties proposes a vision which was is shared by those who believe that *Carlism* was a

¹¹⁶ Montserrat Guibernau, *Nations without States. Political Communities in a Global Age*, Polity Press, 1999.

¹¹⁷Michael, Keating, *Nations against the State. The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland*, Second Edition, Palgrave, 2001

movement which is often mistaken for a pure form of civic patriotism promoted by men of letters supported by working classes. If we refrain to focus on social classes for a moment we would see the process in progress. People were lead to believe that the restoration of historical regional privileges abolished by Philip V were something which was due to Catalans by historical rights. It was in a way a form of re-building a homogenous group on a precedent group(which is present in Sardinian contemporary nation building), it was in a way a form of ethnic nation building which relied on the allegedly traditional Catalan Catholicism and anti-monarchic spirit (Balcells: 31). The middle classes reacted against Carlism and defeated them in 1875. The federalism guided by cultural elite was then downsized. The complete interclass mingling was to be obtained at the end of the 19th century and again relies on the imagery produced by the “virtual” belong of the Catalan people with the *segadors* which are the characters depicted in the Catalan anthem. This time it wasn't only a shared past but a shared class which indicated that the nation had come to terms with class-divisions¹¹⁸; still, the choice of events from the past, and in particular from a rural past which misrepresented Catalan situation in the last few years of the 19th century was a sign of continuum with the past or a sign of the necessity of a shared rural tradition as a glue for national feeling. The anthem was the sign that Catalan nationalism was now heavily demanded regardless of the class divisions. The only time the borugeoise class showed some Spanish nationalistic feeling was during

¹¹⁸ However, Balcells(33) refers to the hypocrisy of representative system. According to Balcells, between 1869 and 1890 elections were manipulated especially in rural districts. The regime under the Restoration appeared to be a modern constitutional monarchy.

the defeat of Cuba in 1898 but it may be caused by the lose of a market. What is more important is that the last twenty years of the 19th century were the years of the birth of Catalan print capitalism. *El Diari Català*, was founded almost in the same years of the *L'Unione Sarda*, but in Sardinia the Italian nation building process was spreading its roots and there weren't the economic conditions for a inter-class dialogue and it seems that no Sardinian free-thinkers on that time could even think of producing valuable literature or politic movements in the Sardinian language. Sardinia could not rely on a powerful economy and trade-bourgeoise did not exist but only latifunda owner and poor share-holders and few professionals in the urban areas. On the other hand, Valentí Almirall was able to push forward inter-class convergence towards the need of a written language. Print capitalism enabled the Catalans to create more coordination even in the peripheral areas. However, is a fact that the support to Catalan Political Organization coming from the middle class of professionals was not relevant at the beginning of the 1890s. But, as reported by Balcells(40), it increased steady from 1895 on.

In those years, Catalan movements was swinging towards conservatorism.

Enric Prat de La Riba, in 1895(in *Compendi de Doctrina Catalanista*, quoted in Balcells: 41), defined Catalonia as the only fatherland or nation of the Catalans whilst Spain was the State which they belonged to. It is quite interesting to see how this positions are expressed in the new proposal for a Catalan status of September 2005 (Whose first article, Catalonia is a nation, has been approved in October 2005).

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